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A defense of intuitions

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Abstract

Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists’ challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions. I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence can help resolve these conflicts.

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Notes

  1. See, e.g., Weinberg et al. (2001); Machery et al. (2004); Knobe (2003a); Nadelhoffer (2004).

  2. Harman (1994); Jackson (1998).

  3. See their blog at http://www.experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/

  4. See, e.g., Goldman (1986, p. 66).

  5. Weinberg et al. call this “Intuition-Driven Romanticism” (2001, pp. 430–436). See also Pust (2000).

  6. Weinberg et al. (2001). See also Nichols et al. (2003).

  7. Swain et al. (forthcoming). For other research to which radical experimentalists have appealed to support their thesis, see, e.g., Machery et al. (2004); Nichols and Knobe (forthcoming).

  8. Weinberg et al. (2001, p. 434).

  9. Swain et al. (forthcoming, p. 19). In an earlier version of this paper, SAW’s claim is even more explicit. They say that their research entails that “philosophers should consider putting their intuitions in escrow.”

  10. Alexander and Weinberg (2007, p. 63). In this paper, Alexander and Weinberg have, as far as I am aware, independently introduced a distinction between the ‘‘proper foundation view’’ and the ‘‘restrictionist view,’’ which seems to correspond to my distinction between moderate and radical experimentalism. Their distinction is not quite my distinction though because they attribute the ‘‘proper foundation view’’ the position that ‘‘Only the results of such research can deliver the intuitions that can serve as evidential basis for or against philosophical claims’’ (2007, p. 61). On my distinction, this position would fall under radical experimentalism. Also, the ‘‘restrictionist’’ in the ‘‘restrictionist view’’ may not be discriminating enough because even philosophers of traditional approaches would accept that there should be some restrictions to the use of intuitions. For example, intuitions elicited under biases, mistaken heuristics and so on, should not count.

  11. Williamson (2004, p. 114).

  12. Williamson (2004, p. 118).

  13. Williamson (2004, pp. 118–122).

  14. Williamson (2004, pp. 121).

  15. Sosa (2005).

  16. Nichols et al. (2003, footnote 2); Weinberg et al. (2001).

  17. Audi (2004).

  18. Swain et al. (forthcoming).

  19. Weinberg et al. (2001).

  20. See, e.g., Sosa (2006); Lynch (2006), for such positive accounts.

  21. Initially, I was attracted to this approach. See also Kauppinen (2007), for a good exposition of this position. The terms ‘‘surface intuitions’’ and ‘‘robust intuitions’’ are from Kauppinen. WNS call robust intuitions ‘‘Austinian intuitions,’’ following a suggestion by Philip Kitcher.

  22. Lehrer (1990).

  23. See Gettier (1963), which inspired these cases.

  24. See, e.g., Dretske (1970).

  25. Weinberg et al. (2001, p. 445).

  26. Weinberg et al. (2001, p. 445).

  27. Weinberg et al. (2001, p. 450).

  28. Alexander and Weinberg (2007, p. 63).

  29. Swain et al. (forthcoming); See also Sinnott-Armstrong (2006), for a helpful example that illustrates this point.

  30. Sosa (2006); Williamson (2004); Lynch (2006).

  31. Sosa (2007, p. 105).

  32. See, e.g., Swain et al. (forthcoming).

  33. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.

  34. Sosa (2006).

  35. Goldman (2007, p. 15).

  36. Sosa (2006, p. 225).

  37. See, e.g., Alexander and Weinberg (2007, p. 60), for the former idea.

  38. Williamson (2004).

  39. Alexander and Weinberg (2007, p. 72).

  40. Sosa (2006).

  41. Lynch (2006, p. 236).

  42. Williamson (2004, pp. 121).

  43. See, e.g., Kauppinen (2007).

  44. Weinberg et al. (2001).

  45. For a good discussion of some of these biases, see Sinnott-Armstrong (2006).

  46. There may be other ways by which intuitions can conflict, e.g. in their strengths, but I shall not consider them here. See, e.g., Sosa (2005).

  47. Some may notice that I am using moral examples here. Those who are sceptical that intuitions are truth-tracking might be even more sceptical about ‘‘moral’’ intuitions, since it could very well be the case that there is no truth to be tracked in the moral case. Personally, I do think that there are moral truths and that our intuitions can track them. See also Crisp (2006, Chap. 3), for this idea. But nothing that follows turns on this. Readers are free to substitute my examples with non-moral ones.

  48. The Knobe effect could be regarded as another example of an internal conflict of intuitions about different (albeit) similar cases. See, e.g., Knobe (2003b).

  49. Sosa (2007).

  50. Nichols and Ulatowski (forthcoming).

  51. For the latter view, see, e.g., Taurek (1977).

  52. Kelly (2005).

  53. See, e.g., Williamson (2004). For a view that we should adjust our beliefs and intuitions when there is a real disagreement with an “epistemic peer,” see, e.g., Christensen (2007).

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Joshua Alexander, Jonathan Weinberg, Roger Crisp, Steve Clarke, Robert Wachbroit, David Wasserman, Guy Kahane, Wibke Gruetjen, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Blome-Tillmann, an anonymous reviewer at Philosophical Studies, and the audiences at the 2007 American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting in San Francisco and at the Oxford University James Martin Advance Research Seminar for their very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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    S. Matthew Liao

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Liao, S.M. A defense of intuitions. Philos Stud 140, 247–262 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9140-x

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