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‘That’-Clauses and Non-nominal Quantification

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Abstract

This paper argues that ‘that’-clauses are not singular terms (without denying that their semantical values are propositions). In its first part, three arguments are presented to support the thesis, two of which are defended against recent criticism. The two good arguments are based on the observation that substitution of ‘the proposition that p’ for ‘that p’ may result in ungrammaticality. The second part of the paper is devoted to a refutation of the main argument for the claim that ‘that’-clauses are singular terms, namely that this claim is needed in order to account for the possibility of quantification into ‘that’-clause position. It is shown that not all quantification in natural languages is quantification into the position of singular terms, but that there is also so-called ‘non-nominal quantification’. A formal analysis of non-nominal quantification is given, and it is argued that quantification into ‘that’-clause position can be treated as another kind non-nominal quantification.

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Correspondence to Tobias Rosefeldt.

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Rosefeldt, T. ‘That’-Clauses and Non-nominal Quantification. Philos Stud 137, 301–333 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-0002-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-0002-8

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