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Realization and the Formulation of Physicalism

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Abstract

Twenty years ago, Richard Boyd suggested that physicalism could be formulated by appeal to a notion of realization, with no appeal to the identity of the non-physical with the physical. In (Melnyk 2003), I developed this suggestion at length, on the basis of one particular account of realization. I now ask what happens if you try to formulate physicalism on the basis of other accounts of realization, accounts due to LePore and Loewer and to Shoemaker. Having explored two new formulations of physicalism, I conclude that my 2003 formulation remains the most promising.

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References

  • Boyd, Richard (1980): ‘Materialism Without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail’, in Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, pp. 268–305 London: Methuen

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, 65211, USA

    Andrew Melnyk

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  1. Andrew Melnyk
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Correspondence to Andrew Melnyk.

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Melnyk, A. Realization and the Formulation of Physicalism. Philos Stud 131, 127–155 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-5986-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-5986-y

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