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Computation without Representation

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Abstract

The received view is that computational states are individuated at least in part by their semantic properties. I offer an alternative, according to which computational states are individuated by their functional properties. Functional properties are specified by a mechanistic explanation without appealing to any semantic properties. The primary purpose of this paper is to formulate the alternative view of computational individuation, point out that it supports a robust notion of computational explanation, and defend it on the grounds of how computational states are individuated within computability theory and computer science. A secondary purpose is to show that existing arguments for the semantic view are defective.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri – St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall (MC 73), 1 University Blvd., St. Louis, MO, 63121-4400, USA

    Gualtiero Piccinini

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Piccinini, G. Computation without Representation. Philos Stud 137, 205–241 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-5385-4

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