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Transmission Failure Failure

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Abstract

I set out the standard view about alleged examples of failure of transmission of warrant, respond to two cases for the view, and argue that the view is false. The first argument for the view neglects the distinction between believing a proposition on the basis of a justification and merely having a justification to believe a proposition. The second argument for the view neglects the position that one 9s justification for believing a conclusion can be one 9s premise for the conclusion, rather than simply one 9s justification for the premise. Finally, the view is false since it is inconsistent with the closure of knowledge as closure is properly understood.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, New York University, 503P Silver Center, 100 Washington Square East, 10003, New York, NY, USA

    Nicholas Silins

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Silins, N. Transmission Failure Failure. Philos Stud 126, 71–102 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4541-1

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