Abstract
In “Imposing Risks,” Judith Thomson gives a case in which, by turning on her stove, she accidentally causes her neighbor’s death. She claims that both the following are true: (1) she ought not to have caused her neighbor’s death; (2) it was permissible for her to turn her stove on. In this paper it is argued that it cannot be that both (1) and (2) are true, that (2) is true, and that therefore (1) is false. How this is so is explained, and the implications of this position regarding the relation between rights and duties is explored.
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Zimmerman, M.J. Risk, Rights, and Restitution. Philos Stud 128, 285–311 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7800-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7800-7