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Logical Properties of Warrant

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Abstract

Trenton Merricks argues that on any reasonable account, warrant must entailtruth. I demonstrate three theses about the properties ofwarrant: (1) Warrant is not unique;there are many properties that satisfy the definition of warrant. (2) Warrant need not entail truth; there are some warrant properties that entailtruthand others that do not. (3) Warrant need not be closed under entailment, even if knowledge is. If knowledge satisfies closure, then some warrant properties satisfy closure while others do not;if knowledge violates closure, then allwarrant properties violate closure.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department, University of Colorado Boulder CO, 80309-0232, USA

    Michael Huemer

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  1. Michael Huemer
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Correspondence to Michael Huemer.

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Huemer, M. Logical Properties of Warrant. Philos Stud 122, 171–182 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-2206-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-2206-0

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