Abstract
In this paper we discuss the definitional problems of altered states of consciousness and their potential relevance in phenomenological investigation. We suggest that visionary states or visionary phantasy working induced by psychedelics (VSs), as extraordinary types of altered states, are appropriate subjects for phenomenological analysis. Naturally, visionary states are not quite ordinary workings of the human mind, however certain cognitive psychological and evolutionary epistemological investigations show that they can give new insights into the nature of consciousness. Furthermore, we suggest that contemporary inquiries concerning altered states in consciousness studies give an opportunity to complete the contemporary phenomenological investigations of phantasy with the notion of visionary phantasy. Here we propose that the similarities and differences between Dieter Lohmar’s weak phantasy (which has a crucial role in empathy and typifying perception) and Benny Shanon’s concept of vision are precisely discernible, and, consequently, it may be possible that weak phantasy and visionary phantasy are situated on the two outermost poles of the colorful spectrum of phantasy activity.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The authors adopted Ned Block’s idea when they characterize ASCs by means of phenomenal and reflective consciousness: “Primary phenomenal consciousness consists of patterns of subjective experience or qualia: sensations, percepts, emotions, body image, mental images, and inner musings. It includes the immediate phenomenal contents of consciousness as such.” (Revonsuo et al. 2009, p. 189) The phenomenal contents (qualia) can be the input of reflective consciousness for further processing (categorizing, judging).
Rock and Krippner contended that a states of consciousness are a set of objects that might include other objects (i.e. the visual stimuli of a painting); but the main problem here is that consciousness is encapsulated and observes its own qualities (Rock and Krippner 2011, 261). This dilemma was also revealed by the representational definition.
Husserl, by means of the paradigm of intentionality, denies the concept of mind as an interiority that simply represents external objects. As Gallagher and Zahavi explains: “The objects of which I am conscious are outside my consciousness, but inside my consciousness I find representations (pictures and signs) of these objects, and these internal objects enable me to be conscious of the external ones. But as Husserl points out, this theory is not only empirically false, it is completely nonsensical. It conceives of consciousness as a box containing representations that resemble external objects, but it forgets to ask how the subject is supposed to know that the representations are in fact representations of external objects.” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 92)
The introduction of Sartre’s concept of intentionality is beyond the limits of this article.
Not only Husserl but Sartre was also interested in the topic of phantasy since 1934. In this year he began to work on a book (L’Imaginaire) about imagination (Sartre 1940). As L’Imaginaire is partly about perceptual anomalies, Sartre decided to induce psychedelic visions by taking mescaline. The trip, alas, took a turn to the worse as the injection of mescaline brought forth horrible hallucinations and caused serious aftereffects. However, Sartre’s adventure created, or at least contributed to, a valuable work of the philosophy of the 20th century. It was the Nausea (Sartre 2013), on of the most important pieces of the movement of existentialism. (Cf. Riedlinger 1982)
“The task is this: to track down, within the framework of pure evidence or self-givenness, all correlations and forms of givenness, and to elucidate them through analysis. And of course not only particular acts will come under consideration here, but their complexities, their connections by way of agreement and disagreement, and the teleologies which emerge from such connections.” (Husserl 1999, p. 68)
The most detailed exposition of the idea of family resemblance (Familienähnlichkeit) can be found in the Philosophical Investigations §§ 65–67 (Wittgenstein 1958a: 32–33). Other passages where the idea is referred to are: The Blue Book (Wittgenstein 1958b: 17); Culture and Value (Wittgenstein 1980: 14).
Shanon performed several hundreds of self-experiments and processed several thousands of experiences.
Phantasy is more close to imagination than hallucination, thus, it can be discriminated from pathological hallucinations: “Only rarely does one represent oneself as participating, in person or by proxy, in a hallucinated scene. In fact one’s sense of self-identify may be so weak that one feels that a dead or depersonalized self is being attacked by the threatening forces. The imaginer, on the other hand, normally retains a quite intact sense of self-identify.” (Casey 2003, p. 83)
Lohmar 2008.67.
In this context primal impression symbolizes the foreign and untamed features of VSs inside the sphere of immanence of consciousness.
“My general theoretical stance in cognition is that there is no demarcation line between ‘raw’ perception, on the one hand, and semantic, meaningful interpretation, on the other hand. Following the philosopher Merleau-Ponty (1962) and the psychologist Gibson (1979), I believe that it is impossible to draw a clear-cut line dividing between naked, interpretation-free sensory inputs and interpretative processes that are subsequently applied to them so as to render these inputs into meaningful percepts. In the spirit of Heidegger (1962), I maintain that cognition is always ‘laden with meaning’. Applied to the example cited, this view implies that, from a cognitive-psychological point of view, if the figure seen was identified as being Jesus, then phenomenologically this is indeed who was seen.” (Shanon 2003, 254)
References
Beischel, J., Rock, A. J., & Krippner, S. (2011). Reconceptualizing the field of altered consciousness: A 50-year retrospective. In E. Cardena & M. Winkelman (Eds.), Altering consciousness: Multidisciplinary perspectives (pp. 113–135). Oxford: Praeger.
Casey, E. S. (2003). Imagination, phantasy, hallucination, and memory. In J. Phillips & J. Morley (Eds.), Imagination and its pathologies (pp. 65–91). London and Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2008). The phenomenological mind. New York: Routledge.
Hauke, C. (2000). Jung and the Postmodern: The Interpretation of Realities. London and New York: Routledge.
Hobson, J. A. (2007). Normal and abnormal states of consciousness. In M. Velmans & S. Schneider (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to consciousness (pp. 101–114). Oxford: Blackwell.
Husserl, E. (1991). On the Phenomenology of Consciousness of Internal Time. (trans: Barnett, J. B.) London: Kluwer Academic Publisher.
Husserl, E. (1999) The Idea of Phenomenology. A Translation of Die Idee der Phiinomenologie Husserliana II (trans: Hardy, L.). Dordrecht: Springer Science + Business Media
Krippner, S. (1972). Altered states of consciousness. In J. White (Ed.), The highest state of consciousness (pp. 1–5). Garden City: Doubleday.
Lohmar, D. (2005). On the function of weak phantasmata in perception: Phenomenological, psychological and neurological clues for the transcendental function of imagination in perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4, 155–167.
Lohmar, D. (2008). Phänomenologie der schwachen Phantasie (Phaenomenologica 185). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Lohmar, D. (2010). The function of weak phantasy in perception and thinking. In S. Gallagher & D. Schmicking (Eds.), Handbook of phenomenology and cognitive science (pp. 159–177). London: Springer.
Lohmar, D. (2012a). Psychoanalysis and the logic of thinking without language. How can we conceive of neurotic displacement, denying, inversion etc. as rational actions of the mind? In D. Lohmar & D. Brudzińska (Eds.), Founding psychoanalysis phenomenologically (pp. 149–168). London: Springer.
Lohmar, D. (2012b). Language and non-linguistic thinking. In D. Zahavi (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199594900.013.0019.
Merleau-Ponty, M (1962). The phenomenology of perception (trans: Smith, C.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Móró, L. (2010). Hallucinatory altered states of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9, 241–252.
Revonsuo, A. (2010). Consciousness: The science of subjectivity. New York: Psychology Press.
Revonsuo, A., Kallio, S., & Sikka, P. (2009). What is an altered state of consciousness? Philosophical Psychology, 22(2), 187–204.
Riedlinger, T. J. (1982). Satre’s rite of passage. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 14(2), 105–123.
Robin, F. (2010). Imagery and memory illusion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9, 253–262.
Rock, A. J., & Krippner, S. (2007a). Does the concept of “altered states of consciousness” rest on a mistake? International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 26, 33–40.
Rock, A. J., & Krippner, S. (2007b). Shamanism and the confusion of consciousness with phenomenological content. North American Journal of Psychology, 9, 485–500.
Rock, A. J., & Krippner, S. (2011). States of consciousness redefined as patterns of phenomenal properties: An experimental application. In D. Cvetkovic & I. Cosic (Eds.), States of consciousness: Experimental insights into meditation, waking, sleep and dreams (pp. 257–272). New York: Springer.
Sartre, J.-P. (1940). L’Imaginaire. Paris: Gallimard.
Sartre, J.-P. (2013/1938). Nausea. New York: New Directions.
Shanon, B. (2003). The antipodes of the mind: Charting the phenomenology of ayahuaska experiences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shanon, B. (2010). The Epistemics of Ayahuasca Visions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9, 263-280.
Stone, M. (2006). The analyst’s body as tuning fork: embodied resonance in countertransference. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 51, 109–124.
Tart, C. T. (1969). Introduction. In C. T. Tart (Ed.), Altered states of consciousness (pp. 1–7). New York: Wiley.
Tymoczko, D. (1996). The nitrous oxide philosopher. The Atlantic, May 1.
Winkelman, M. (2011a). Shamanism and the alteration of consciousness. In E. Cardena & M. Winkelman (Eds.), Altering consciousness: Multidisciplinary perspective (pp. 160–177). Oxford: Praeger.
Winkelman, M. (2011b). A paradigm for understanding altered consciousness: The integrative mode of consciousness. In E. Cardena & M. Winkelman (Eds.), Altering consciousness: Multidisciplinary perspectives (pp. 24–41). Oxford: Praeger.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958a). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958b). Preliminary studies for the ‘philosophical investigations’ generally known as the blue and brown books. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1980). Culture and value. (edited by G. H. von Wright in collaboration with H. Nyman). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wolin, R. (1994). Walter Benjamin: An aesthetic of redemption. University of California Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Horváth, L., Szummer, C. & Szabo, A. Weak phantasy and visionary phantasy: the phenomenological significance of altered states of consciousness. Phenom Cogn Sci 17, 117–129 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9497-4
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9497-4