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The artifactual mind: overcoming the ‘inside–outside’ dualism in the extended mind thesis and recognizing the technological dimension of cognition

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Abstract

This paper explains why Clark’s Extended Mind thesis is not capable of sufficiently grasping how and in what sense external objects and technical artifacts can become part of our human cognition. According to the author, this is because a pivotal distinction between inside and outside is preserved in the Extended Mind theorist’s account of the relation between the human organism and the world of external objects and artifacts, a distinction which they proclaim to have overcome. Inspired by Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy of mind, in particular, the author tries to find a way out of this ‘inside–outside’ fallacy. External objects, artifacts or processes should, according to him, not be conceived as inanimate and unintelligent matter utilised by a separately living, inner mental sphere that has set certain pre-established goals for itself. Mind has rather an artifactual character. It is not extended by an inner biological cognitive core but rather unfolds itself through objects and artifacts. Mind as such is, especially in our modern technological culture, shaped by virtue of and through technical artifacts. Recognizing this artifactual dimension of mind will, the author concludes, enable a more critical analysis of contemporary claims that ascribe certain original and irreducible features to thinking.

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Notes

  1. Peirce termed, probably independently from Husserl, his overall approach as “phenomenology.” Later he uses the notion “phaneroscopy” for his method. See Aydin (2007a) for a comparison between Peirce’s and Husserl’s phenomenology.

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Acknowledgments

This article incorporates reworked and further developed excerpts from my Dutch article 'Het uiterlijk van het innerlijk: Extended Mind, technologie en de binnen-buiten scheiding,’ Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 74/2012, p. 701–728.

The author would like to thank Peter-Paul Verbeek and the other members of the Philosophy of Human-Technology Relations Group, and Philip Brey for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this article.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Delft University of Technology, P.O. Box 5015, 2600 GA, Delft, The Netherlands

    Ciano Aydin

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217 (Office: Cubicus C-314), 7500 AE, Enschede, The Netherlands

    Ciano Aydin

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Correspondence to Ciano Aydin.

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Aydin, C. The artifactual mind: overcoming the ‘inside–outside’ dualism in the extended mind thesis and recognizing the technological dimension of cognition. Phenom Cogn Sci 14, 73–94 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-013-9319-x

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