Abstract
My claim is clear and unambiguous: no machine will pass a well-designed Turing Test unless we find some means of embedding it in lived social life. We have no idea how to do this but my argument, and all our evidence, suggests that it will not be a necessary condition that the machine have more than a minimal body. Exactly how minimal is still being worked out.
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Notes
Lest there be any misunderstanding, all parties to the debate believe that having ‘intelligence’ implies having a store of tacit knowledge that cannot be acquired through formal means; the argument is about how it is acquired. Dreyfus stresses the importance of the body and does not much discuss the importance of embedding in society. Collins stresses the importance of embedding in society. Collins believes, more-or-less, that embedding in the language of the society is enough to afford fluency in the language, including its references to practical matters. In sum, Collins stresses embedding, not embodying; Dreyfus stresses embodying and does not talk much about embedding. The key to the debate might be how much embodying is necessary for embedding.
The claim about Collins’s abilities in respect of gravitational wave physics and other empirical evidence along the same lines will be found in Collins, Evan, Ribeiro, & Hall, 2006. Other arguments made here are supported and illustrated in Collins, 2004; Collins and Evans, 2007; Selinger, Dreyfus and Collins, 2008 and the materials that can be found at http://www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/expertise.
References
Collins, H. M. (2004). Interactional expertise as a third kind of knowledge, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3/2, 125–143.
Collins, H. M., & Evans, R. (2007). Rethinking expertise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (in press)
Collins, H. M. Evans, R., Ribeiro, R., & Hall, M. (2006). Experiments with interactional expertise. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 37A/4, 656–674, (December).
Selinger, E., Dreyfus, H., & Collins, H. (2008). Embodiment of interactional expertise. In H. M. Collins (Ed.), Case Studies of Expertise and Experience: Special Issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 39(1) (in press).
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Collins, H.M. Response to Selinger on Dreyfus. Phenom Cogn Sci 7, 309–311 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9049-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9049-z