Abstract
We have two aims in this paper. The first is negative: to demonstrate the problems in Bernard Gert’s account of common morality, in particular as it applies to professional morality. The second is positive: to suggest a more satisfactory explanation of the moral basis of professional role morality, albeit one that is broadly consistent with Gert’s notion of common morality, but corrects and supplements Gert’s theory. The paper is in three sections. In the first, we sketch the main features of Gert’s account of common morality in general. In the second, we outline Gert’s explanation of the source of professional moral rules and demonstrate its inadequacy. In the third section, we provide an account of our own collectivist needs-based view of the source of the role-moral obligations of many professional roles, including those of health care professionals.
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Notes
Gert uses the term “duty” to refer to “what is required by special circumstances or by one’s role in society—primarily one’s job or special situation” [2, p. 36]. So for Gert, people do not have a duty, as such, not to kill, though of course they are morally required not to kill. We conform to philosophical orthodoxy in using “duty” to refer to what we are morally required to do.
The points we make here are developed in greater detail in [6].
These expectations are based on an understanding of doctors’ duties in their role as providers of health care. Given the interlocking structure of institutions in modern societies, and the way in which the medical profession interfaces with other institutions such as the law and insurance, arguably doctors also have such duties as the provision of information in certain circumstances to insurers and law enforcement agencies, and so we may have reasonable expectations about such matters.
References
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Acknowledgement
Authors thank the editor of this issue for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Alexandra, A., Miller, S. Ethical theory, “common morality,” and professional obligations. Theor Med Bioeth 30, 69–80 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-009-9097-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-009-9097-1