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Shareholder activism in the UK: types of activists, forms of activism, and their impact on a target’s performance

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Abstract

Considering the recent rapid expansion of shareholder activism phenomenon in the United Kingdom (UK) and the vast amount of resources committed to it by corporations, government and investors, its effectiveness has become a crucial subject for investigation. This article analyzes organizational outcomes of shareholder activism in the UK. This research is based on a unique comprehensive database of shareholder activism events during the period of 1998–2008. We provide a detailed account of different types of activists, activism strategies and shareholder demands associated with the events of activism. Our findings show that the effectiveness of shareholder activism in terms of abnormal stock-market returns varies dramatically depending on its form, type of investor and the nature of investor proposals.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Sir John Cass Business School, City University London, 106 Bunhill Row, London, EC1Y 8TZ, UK

    Igor Filatotchev

  2. Ernest & Young Ltd, London, UK

    Oksana Dotsenko

Authors
  1. Igor Filatotchev
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  2. Oksana Dotsenko
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Correspondence to Igor Filatotchev.

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Filatotchev, I., Dotsenko, O. Shareholder activism in the UK: types of activists, forms of activism, and their impact on a target’s performance. J Manag Gov 19, 5–24 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-013-9266-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-013-9266-5

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