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A Fig Leaf for The Naked Corporation

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Abstract

The implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States and the German Law of transparency and disclosure (TransPuG) lead to a claim for more disclosure of information with the goal of a “naked corporation” such that all information is available to the (potential) investors. In this article we pick up this debate and present arguments that the “naked corporation” does not offer an efficient degree of disclosure, as we have to distinguish between more and better information. Concerning the latter the new regulations are critical. Cognitive limitations and bounded rationality highlight the risk of information overload. Asymmetric information illustrates that self induced disclosure can do better than a mandatory one. Therefore the legislator should not be asked for specific informational contents but for regulations on the way of information provision.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business Administration, University of Vienna, Bruenner Straße 72, A-1210, Vienna, Austria

    Udo C. Braendle & Juergen Noll

Authors
  1. Udo C. Braendle
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  2. Juergen Noll
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Correspondence to Udo C. Braendle.

Additional information

JEL Codes: K22, G34, D82

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Braendle, U.C., Noll, J. A Fig Leaf for The Naked Corporation. J Manage Governance 9, 79–99 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-005-1567-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-005-1567-x

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