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Emotional and Social Factors influence Poker Decision Making Accuracy

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Abstract

Poker is a social game, where success depends on both game strategic knowledge and emotion regulation abilities. Thus, poker provides a productive environment for studying the effects of emotional and social factors on micro-economic decision making. Previous research indicates that experiencing negative emotions, such as moral anger, reduces mathematical accuracy in poker decision making. Furthermore, various social aspects of the game—such as losing against “bad players” due to “bad luck”—seem to fuel these emotional states. We designed an Internet-based experiment, where participants’ (N = 459) mathematical accuracy in five different poker decision making tasks were assessed. In addition, we manipulated the emotional and social conditions under which the tasks were presented, in a 2 × 2 experimental setup: (1) Anger versus neutral emotional state—participants were primed either with an anger-inducing, or emotionally neutral story, and (2) Social cue versus non-social cue—during the tasks, either an image of a pair of human eyes was “following” the mouse cursor, or an image of a black moving box was presented. The results showed that anger reduced mathematical accuracy of decision making only when participants were “being watched” by a pair of moving eyes. Experienced poker players made mathematically more accurate decisions than inexperienced ones. The results contribute to current understanding on how emotional and social factors influence decision making accuracy in economic games.

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Acknowledgments

We wish to thank the Finnish Foundation for Alcohol Studies, the Kone Foundation, and the Academy of Finland for their financial support in this project. We also wish to thank the following Finnish poker communities for their interest in our research: www.pokerisivut.com, www.pokeritieto.com and www.pokerista.net. We would like to thank Arttu Manninen (arttu@kaktus.cc) for writing the code for the eye stimulus. Lastly, we are grateful to Apophenia for providing us with ideas and inspiration.

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. Participation in this Internet-based study was voluntary, and the anonymity of all respondents was guaranteed. Information provided by respondents will be used only for scientific purposes.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cognitive Science Unit, Institute of Behavioural Sciences, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Michael Laakasuo & Jussi Palomäki

  2. Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Mikko Salmela

Authors
  1. Michael Laakasuo
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  2. Jussi Palomäki
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  3. Mikko Salmela
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Laakasuo.

Appendix 1

Appendix 1

Explicit Presentation of the Poker Decision Making Tasks (Dependent Variable)

Detailed descriptions of the five Texas no limit hold ‘em (NLHE) poker decision making tasks/scenarios are presented here. The scenarios involved NLHE, since it is currently very likely the most popular and recognized poker game variant. In both scenarios, participants could choose one of two options, fold or call, in accordance to the rules of NLHE.

Poker Terminology Abbreviations and Explanations:

To fold = To give up your hand

To call = To match a bet made by an opponent

To bet all-in = To bet all the money/chips one currently has in play

bb = big blind

h = hearts, s = spades, c = clubs, d = diamonds

As Kh Qc Jd Ts = Ace of spades, King of hearts, Queen of clubs, Jack of diamonds, Ten of spades

Knowing for a fact an opponent’s range of possible hands for a given action, one’s own hand, and the amount of money/chips invested in the pot, enables a mathematical calculation of equity. Here, equity corresponds to the likelihood of a given hand (the hand held by the participant in a given scenario) winning against a specified hand range. The expected value of folding is always exactly zero. Thus, calling is mathematically correct if and only if its equity is above zero. Correspondingly, folding is mathematically correct if and only if the equity of calling is below zero. PokerStrategy.com Equilator (version 1.8) was used to calculate the distribution of equity between the participants’ hand and the opponent’s hand range.

The monetary values are depicted as big blinds, which, in general, correspond to the minimum bet allowed in any given game. Typically, in a NLHE game with a maximum buy in of $100, the big blind will be $1. Correspondingly, in a NLHE game with a maximum buy in of $5,000, the big blind will be $50.

Scenario 1

You are holding: 5s, 4s (five of spades, four of spades).

The flop is: Kh, 9s, 6s (king of hearts, nine of spades, six of spades)

In the beginning of the hand, both you and your opponent had 100 bb. Currently, on the flop, the size of the pot is 6 bb, and both you and your opponent have 97 bb in your stacks. Your opponent bets all-in.

You know for a fact that your opponent can have anything. In other words, you know for a fact that your opponent’s range of possible hands is any two cards (or “random”).

What do you do: Call/Fold?

See (Table 2).

Table 2 Scenario 1 mathematical evaluation
Full size table

Scenario 2

You are holding: 2c, 2s (deuce of clubs, deuce of spades)

The flop is: 3s, 4s, 5s (three of spades, four of spades, five of spades)

In the beginning of the hand, both you and your opponent had 150 bb. Currently, on the flop, the size of the pot is 2 bb, and both you and your opponent have 149 bb in your stacks. Your opponent bets all-in.

You know for a fact that your opponent can have anything. In other words, you know for a fact that your opponent’s range of possible hands is any two cards (or “random”).

What do you do: Call/Fold?

See (Table 3).

Table 3 Scenario 2 mathematical evaluation
Full size table

Scenario 3

You are holding: Ts, 8s (ten of spades, eight of spades)

The flop is: Qs, As, 9h (queen of spades, ace of spades, nine of hearts)

In the beginning of the hand, both you and your opponent had 100 bb. Currently, on the flop, the size of the pot is 8 bb, and both you and your opponent have 96 bb in your stacks. Your opponent bets all-in.

You know for a fact that your opponent has two “picture cards” (here, “picture cards” refer to Jacks, Queens and Kings—i.e., cards that have “pictures of people” in them) in his/her hand—but you do not know anything else. In other words, you know for a fact that your opponent’s range of possible hands is any two “picture cards” (either two of the same picture card, or two different picture cards, regardless of the suits)

What do you do: Call/Fold?

See (Table 4).

Table 4 Scenario 3 mathematical evaluation
Full size table

Scenario 4

You are holding: Jh, Th (jack of hearts, ten of hearts)

The flop is: 3c, 7h, 8h (three of clubs, seven of hearts, eight of hearts)

In the beginning of the hand, both you and your opponent had 100 bb. Currently, on the flop, the size of the pot is 2bb, and both you and your opponent have 99 bb in your stacks. Your opponent bets all-in.

You know for a fact that your opponent has Tc, Td (ten of clubs, ten of diamonds) in his/her hand.

What do you do: Call/Fold?

See (Table 5).

Table 5 Scenario 4 mathematical evaluation
Full size table

Scenario 5

You are holding: 9h, 8s (nine of hearts, eight of spades)

The flop is: 6h, 7h, 8c (six of hearts, seven of hearts, eight of clubs)

In the beginning of the hand, both you and your opponent had 100 bb. Currently, on the flop, the size of the pot is 2 bb, and both you and your opponent have 99 bb in your stacks. Your opponent bets all-in.

You know for a fact that your opponent has Qh, Jh (queen of hearts, jack of hearts) in his/her hand.

What do you do: Call/Fold?

See (Table 6).

Table 6 Scenario 5 mathematical evaluation
Full size table

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Laakasuo, M., Palomäki, J. & Salmela, M. Emotional and Social Factors influence Poker Decision Making Accuracy. J Gambl Stud 31, 933–947 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10899-014-9454-5

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