Abstract
Alfred Mele’s zygote argument is widely considered to be the strongest version of the manipulation argument against compatibilism (about free will and determinism). Opponents have focused largely on the first of its two premises and on the overall dialectic. My focus here will be on the underlying thought experiment—the Diana scenario—and on the second premise of the argument. I will argue that reflection on the Diana scenario shows that the second premise does not hold, and we will see that my objection to the second premise helps to defend the claim that manipulation arguments face, in general, a dilemma.
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Notes
Arguably, traditional compatibilism supports a response strategy to this challenge that is not available to proponents of the currently prominent non-traditional versions of compatibilism (such as Frankfurt 1971, Dennett 1984, and Fischer and Ravizza 1998). According to traditional compatibilism, the ability to do otherwise is compatible with determinism. Non-traditional versions of compatibilism deny this (or remain agnostic about this). The manipulation of an agent may bring it about that the agent will not do otherwise without bringing it about that the agent could not do otherwise. If a manipulated agent retains the ability to do otherwise, then he or she may well be free and morally responsible (partly because of having the ability to do otherwise). If, on the other hand, a manipulated agent is not able to do otherwise, then traditional compatibilists can argue that this must be due to the fact that the agent has been manipulated (rather than the fact that the agent’s actions are causally determined). This move is not available to proponents of non-traditional compatibilism, because they do not hold that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with determinism. However, as traditional compatibilism is widely rejected, we can put this issue aside and limit our considerations to the currently prominent non-traditional versions of compatibilism.
In two recent articles, Waller (2014) and Barnes (2013) reject premise 2 as well. I was not aware of their replies when I wrote this paper and I would like to thank an anonymous referee for the references. Their objections to premise 2 differ substantially from the reply that I just gave. According to Barnes, there is a significant difference between the Diana scenario and normal deterministic scenarios concerning the agent’s potential for creativity. As we have seen, my response does not appeal to the notion of creativity at all. Waller focuses on Diana’s “effective intentions” in the creation of Ernie’s zygote, and her objection is based on a general principle concerning blameworthiness. I have focused instead on the relation between the creation of the zygote and the circumstances that shape Ernie’s development thereafter, and the mentioned principle on blameworthiness plays no role in my reply.
To be more precise, one could distinguish here between a necessary and a sufficient role in making this the case. However, for my purposes, the offered formulation is precise enough.
References
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Schlosser, M.E. Manipulation and the Zygote Argument: Another Reply. J Ethics 19, 73–84 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-014-9183-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-014-9183-0