Abstract
This discussion examines two of the central notions at work in Sterba’s From Rationality to Equality: question-beggingness, and the notion of a rational requirement. I point out that, against certain unreasonable positions, begging the question is a perfectly reasonable option. I also argue that if we use the sense of “rational requirement” that philosophers ought (and tend) to have in mind when defending the idea that morality is rationally required, then Sterba has not succeed in defending this idea. Rather, he has at most demonstrated the rational preferability of morality over two other positions: an extreme egoism, and a very particular form of altruism. But another position exists: one that holds altruistic reasons to exist, and to be capable of justifying sacrifices, but that also holds that they do not require us to sacrifice our interests in the way that morality sometimes does require.
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Notes
Most recently in Sterba (2013).
Sterba’s principle of egoism is cast in terms of “ought” rather than reasons (Sterba 2013: 33). But since the dispute between the egoist and the altruist is cast in terms of reasons, I prefer to keep the whole discussion at that level.
“[T]he pure egoist thinks that the interests of others do not count for herself, except instrumentally.” (Sterba 2013: 34, n. 22)
Here “prima facie” seems to mean “contributory,” rather than “seeming,” since it will not help Sterba for the egoist to grant that altruistic reasons merely have the appearance of being reasons.
Sterba seems to accept this account of question-begging. See Sterba (2013: 33).
Mill (2001/1861: 62) attributes this position to Bentham, and endorses it himself.
In this discussion I leave the possibility of perfect ties to the side. Perfect ties would be too rare to be relevant to the issues at stake here.
See Sterba (2013: 83) for an explicit denial that he needs to assume this.
I defend this position at greatest length in Gert (2004).
Many thanks to Jim Sterba for helpful email discussions.
References
Gert, Bernard. 2001. Replies to three critics. The Journal of Value Inquiry 35: 455–476.
Gert, Bernard. 2005. Morality: Its nature and justification. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gert, Joshua. 2004. Brute rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mill, John Stuart. 2001/1861. Utilitarianism, ed. George Sher. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Parfit, Derek. 2011. On what matters, vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2012. The justification of morality. In Morality: The why and the what of it, ed. James Sterba, et al., 109–120. Boulder: Westview Press.
Sterba, James. 2013. From rationality to equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sterba, James. 2012a. “My responses to Carla and Josh”. Seattle, WA: American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division).
Sterba, James. 2012b. “Completing the Hobbesian and Kantian Project in ethics”. Seattle, WA: American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division).
Sterba, James. 2005. Responses to my critics, Erin Kelly and B. C. Postow. Journal of Social Philosophy 36: 397–405.
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Gert, J. Begging the Question: A Qualified Defense. J Ethics 18, 279–297 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-014-9173-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-014-9173-2