Abstract
We study the local stability properties of a nonlinear Bertrand duopoly with vertical differentiation and heterogeneous players under the hypotheses of both covered and uncovered markets. In the former case, the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium can undergo a flip bifurcation when the extent of consumer’s heterogeneity increases. In the latter, the quality differential determines the stability of prices over time. Numerical evidence is provided to show the occurrence of endogenous fluctuations.
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Notes
As pointed out by Motta (1993), by interpreting ϕ as a measure of the marginal rate of substitution between income and quality in a model where consumers’ tastes heterogeneity is assumed, allows comparisons with models where there exists consumers’ incomes heterogeneity (see, e.g., Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979; Shaked and Sutton 1982, 1983).
This will be clear from Eqs. (13) and (26) in the sequel of the paper. Note that this condition also guarantees that outputs and profits of both firms are positive at an interior equilibrium.
As point out by Bischi et al. (1998, p. 561), in this class of models: “The dynamic game is based on the assumption that the two producers have not a complete knowledge of the market, hence they behave adaptively, following a bounded rationality adjustment process based on a local estimate of the marginal profit.” We note that it is standard in this literature to refer to the player that expects the output/price of the competitor be equal to the last period’s one as being “naïve”, and to the player that uses the myopic adjustment mechanism (through marginal profits) described by Dixit (1986) and Bischi and Naimzada (2000) as being “bounded rational”.
It is important to note that when the coefficient α tends to zero, the bounded rational firm does not adjust its production over time, i.e. there is no strategic interaction in such a case. This implies that the bounded rational firm does not behave as if it were naïve when α = 0. The naïve firm in fact uses the available information through the reaction function (market demand) to behave optimally over time. The bounded rational firm, instead, adjust its prices over time on the basis of its marginal profits. When both firms are naïve, the Nash equilibrium is stable (see Theocharis 1960).
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The authors gratefully acknowledge three anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Endogenous fluctuations (covered market)
In this appendix we show with numerical experiments that endogenous fluctuations can occur when a reduces (covered market). The parameter values are: b = 1, α = 4, u H = 2 and u L = 1. Then, a BH/NL = 1.4, α 1 = 6/5 and α 2 = 8/5 (BH/NL), and a NH/BL = 0.2 and α 3 = 12/5 (NH/BL). Under this parameter constellation, we find a BH/NL > b/2 so that the Nash equilibrium \( E_{{BH/NL}}^{{CM}} = E_{{NH/BL}}^{{CM}} \) in the BH/NL model is unstable and trajectories are non-convergent for any a ∊ [0, 1/2). With regards to the NH/BL model, 4 = α > α 3 implying that \( E_{{BH/NL}}^{{CM}} = E_{{NH/BL}}^{{CM}} \) is stable or unstable depending on the relative size of a. To this purpose, Fig. 3a and b show the bifurcation diagrams for a under NH/BL, and depict the limit point of p L and p H , respectively, when the initial conditions are p H (0) = 0.1 and p L (0) = 0.05. The figures reveal that the long-run values of prices increase and they are locally asymptotically stable when a reduces from 1/2 to 0.2. Then, a flip bifurcation occurs at a NH/BL = 0.2. Then, a two-period cycle (broken off in the range a ∊ (0.05776, 0.05727) by more complicated dynamic events) emerges. As long as a reduces, we observe four-period cycles, eight-period cycles, and cycles of higher periodicity when a becomes lower. Figure 4 also depicts the chaotic attractor (black-coloured) and the corresponding basin of attraction (red-coloured) for a = 0.03.
Appendix B. Endogenous fluctuations (uncovered market)
We show here that endogenous fluctuations occur when u L raises (uncovered market). We depict bifurcation diagrams and basins of attraction only under BH/NL expectations, since the case NH/BL shows similar dynamic events.
The parameter set is: b = 1 (so that α 4 = 6/5 and α 5 = 2) and a = 0.5. Then, we choose α = 1.9, u H = 2 and let u L increase from 0 to 2. These parameter values generate \( u_L^{{BH/NL}} = 0.{2}0{51} \). We note that since α 4 < α < α 5, then the Nash equilibrium \( E_{{BH/NL}}^{{UM}} = E_{{NH/BL}}^{{UM}} \) is locally stable or unstable depending on the relative size of u L . Figure 5a and b show the bifurcation diagrams for u L under BH/NL, and depict the limit point of p L and p H , respectively, when the initial conditions are p H (0) = 0.1 and p L (0) = 0.05. The Nash equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable when u L is small. A flip bifurcation occurs at \( u_L^{{BH/NL}} = 0.{2}0{51} \). Then, a two-period cycle emerges and cycles of higher periodicity occur when u L becomes larger. It is interesting to note that in the long run the trend of the high-quality price is monotonically decreasing, while the low-quality price increases (decreases) when the index u L is small (large). Figure 6 depicts the chaotic attractor (black-coloured) and the corresponding basin of attraction (red-coloured) for u L = 1.85.
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Fanti, L., Gori, L. Stability Analysis in a Bertrand Duopoly with Different Product Quality and Heterogeneous Expectations. J Ind Compet Trade 13, 481–501 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-012-0134-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-012-0134-9