Abstract
The paper proposed a novel approach to identifying intra-household allocations in households with two decision-makers. We addressed the issue by using the collective model of labor supply. Most empirical studies based on the collective approach were restricted to the identification of the sharing rule guiding individual allocations up to a constant. We suggested using individual welfare satisfaction data as an additional source of identification. An empirical example was given using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. The sharing rule was found to be related to the spouses’ wage and age differences and number of children. Sharing varied with the level of household income: In low-income households, sharing was equal; in middle (high) income households men held a slight (strong) advantage.
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Notes
For example, many governments shy away from traditional welfare to work programs (described for example in Kim 2012) to the policies that address the relative unattractiveness of work by directly subsidizing wage rates in order to favor integrating low-skilled workers into the labor market. The corresponding programs are often based on household income and household structure.
See Browning et al. (2014) for the comprehensive survey.
All the information on the RLMS data may be found on the project web page: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms.
The full set of the estimates is not reported in the paper but available on request.
Up to a constant.
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Appendix
Appendix
The parameters derived in this section are related to the distribution of \(\varepsilon\) from
where \(z_1 =\kappa _1 - \mathbf{\gamma }'\mathbf{Z}\) and \(z_2 =\kappa _2 - \mathbf{\gamma }'\mathrm{\mathbf{Z}}\).
The Mean and Variance of the \(\mathbf u _\mathbf eq\) Distribution
The mean of the truncated standard normal distribution is found using the following property of the standard normal density function \(f(\varepsilon ) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi } }\exp ( - \frac{\varepsilon ^2}{2})\): \(\frac{\partial f(\varepsilon )}{\partial \varepsilon } = - \varepsilon f(\varepsilon )\).
where \(F\)(.) is the standard normal cumulative density function.
The variance is calculatedFootnote 5 Using the same approach:
\(( {E (\varepsilon \vert z_1 < \varepsilon < z_2 )}\) is defined by (A2). \(E (\varepsilon ^2\vert z_1 < \varepsilon < z_2 )\) is found by integrating by parts:
Finally, using (A2–A4) the variance of the truncated low is found as
Selection Bias Correction
Given selection of the households whose members report the same level of satisfaction, the expected value of the error terms of the labor supply equations are not zero:
where \(M(\sigma _{u_i\varepsilon })\) is an unknown coefficient depending on the covariance between \(\varepsilon\) and \(u_i\) .
The correction term \(E(\varepsilon \vert I=1)\) is defined for each individual in the same way as \(E(u_{eq} \vert I=1)\) shown by (A2):
where \(f(\cdot )\) and \(F(\cdot )\) are the standard normal density and cumulative density functions respectively.
Constraint on the Cholesky Parameters
The constraint on \(\sigma _{u_{eq}} ^2 = Var (\varepsilon \vert z_1 < \varepsilon < z_2 )\) is respected by normalizing the error term of the third equation by \(u^{*}_{eq} = \frac{u_{eq} }{\sqrt{Var (\varepsilon \vert z_1 < \varepsilon < z_2 )} }\). Constrained (and normalized to 1) variance of \(u^{*}_{eq}\) implies a constraint on Cholesky matrix parameters \(L\). This constraint is found setting the relationship between \(Var(u^{*}_{eq})\) and matrix \(L~\)elements:
which implies the following restriction on Cholesky matrix parameters
A constraint on \(l_{33}\) is then \(l_{33} = \sqrt{1 - (l_{31} )^2 - (l_{32} )^2}\).
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Radchenko, N. Welfare Sharing Within Households: Identification from Subjective Well-being Data and the Collective Model of Labor Supply. J Fam Econ Iss 37, 254–271 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10834-015-9446-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10834-015-9446-3