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Learning about movies: the impact of movie release types on the nationwide box office

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Abstract

Major Hollywood studios typically release new movies in North America in one of the two ways, wide release or platform release. In this paper, we investigate how release form affects the demand of a new movie after it is nationally released. In particular, we focus on movies for which the platform release is pre-planned to make the problem tractable. We estimate our model using a sample of Hollywood movies that eventually received nationwide release from 1999 to 2003. Our results show that platform release shifts consumers’ perception of unobservable movie appeal through its first stage performance, which turns out to be a stronger effect than that of advertising. Meanwhile, we find that the demand for platform movies decays faster than for wide release ones after their national release. Using counterfactual analysis, we find that more than half of the platform movies which later went to national release would have earned higher profits if they had been given a wide release.

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Notes

  1. We will define the national market later in the paper.

  2. Later on, CMR was bought by TNS.

  3. To avoid including genres in which very few movies appeared, we reduce the number of genres to three, that is, drama, comedy and action. For a movie, we collect the genre keywords from IMDB.COM. The movie’s genre is defined based on whichever of the above three genres appears first.

  4. We tested our model using both 300 theatres and 400 theatres as a criterion and obtained similar results to those reported in the paper.

  5. We tested our model using platform movies that went to national release within 3 weeks and obtained similar results to those reported in the paper.

  6. Notice that in our data, we do not have the number of people going to see the movie in a certain week. Instead, we have weekly box office revenue for each movie. Given that there is very small variation across time in movie ticket price, we can infer the total number of weekly movie goers through dividing the weekly box office by average ticket price. We have yearly average ticket price from the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) from 1999 to 2003. However, we choose not to use these because that will create an artificial change in number of weekly movie goers at the beginning of each year. Instead, we use the average ticket price across 1999 to 2003, which is $5.59, in our estimation. We tested our model using the yearly average prices and obtained similar results.

  7. Major Distributor indicates whether a movie is distributed by Paramount, Sony Pictures (Columbia Pictures, TriStar), The Walt Disney Company (Buena Vista, Touchstone, and Hollywood Pictures), Twentieth Century Fox, Universal, or Warner Bros (New Line, Fine Line).

  8. We only have the average critics’ and viewers’ ratings in our data. If we had information on the distribution of critics’ and viewers’ ratings, we could potentially model the uncertainty in viewers’ initial belief (σ1) as a function of the variances in those ratings.

  9. Genre is the most straightforward and available variable to measure similarity of movies. We also tried other variables such as MPAA rating and found similar results.

  10. Heckman’s two-step approach (with the release decision modelled in a reduced form then controlling for selection bias in the demand function) is difficult to implement here because this requires additional exogenous information uncorrelated with movie demand, which is hard to obtain and justify.

  11. The results reported hereafter are based on the estimation that uses the full sample as keeping a holdout sample is no longer necessary.

  12. That is, $1 million in first stage box office revenues shifts consumers’ prior belief of unobservable appeal to the same extent as $44.26 million advertising expenditure for dramas, $15.03 million for comedies, and $13.56 million for action movies.

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Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Tirtha Dhar and Jason Ho for providing us access to the data. The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Greater China Business Research Institute, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business.

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Correspondence to Xinlei Chen.

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The authors are listed alphabetically and contributed equally to the paper.

Appendix: switching platform movies to wide release

Appendix: switching platform movies to wide release

In the counterfactual analysis, we compare the profitability of wide release versus platform release for the platform movies in our sample. The decision process of the movie studio is assumed to be as follows. In stage 1, the national release date is set. It is exogenous in our counterfactual analysis, and it is set as the takeoff week of the platform movie. In stage 2, the movie studio decides to adopt a wide release or platform release strategy, given the release date (T 0j ), movie characteristics, X j , and the unobservable (to the studio) appeal of the movie, \( \widetilde{A}_{j}^{u} \). In stage 3, the movie studio decides on the advertising expenditure (Ad j ) and number of theatres engaged in the opening week. Once the movie is released, the number of theatres in the following weeks is largely determined by box office performance (Krider et al. 2005). In addition, we make the following assumptions:

  1. A1

    On average, \( \widetilde{A}_{j}^{u} \) equals the realized actual unobservable appeal of a movie, \( A_{j}^{u} \). Specifically, we write \( \widetilde{A}_{j}^{u} \sim N\left( {A_{j}^{u} ,\sigma_{{\tilde{A}}}^{2} } \right) \).

  2. A2

    Observed advertising expenditure, number of theatres, and movie life period are assumed to be the equilibrium outcome given X j and \( \widetilde{A}_{j}^{u} \). However, they cannot be determined from the estimated demand model directly because we have no information on such missing factors as the financing ability and risk preference of the studio and the bargaining power of studio versus exhibitors. Instead, we use reduced form regressions to establish the relationships between those equilibrium outcomes and\( \left( {X_{j} ,\widetilde{A}_{j}^{u} } \right) \), that is, \( \left( {X_{j} ,\widetilde{A}_{j}^{u} } \right) \)are the independent variables in those regressions.

Given the above assumptions, we can compare the profitability of wide release versus platform release for movies given their characteristics (X j , \( \widetilde{A}_{j}^{u} \), T 0j . We can assume \( \widetilde{A}_{j}^{u} \) = \( A_{j}^{u} \) in our analysis to see whether the observed platform releases are optimal.

1.1 Advertising, Number of Theatres, and Movie Life under Wide Release

Before conducting the counterfactual analysis, we have to predict the advertising budget, the length of the theatrical run of the movie (“life” period), and the number of theatres engaged in each week for a platform movie should it switch to wide release. As discussed above, we use a reduced form approach to establish the link between these variables and \( \left( {X_{j} ,\widetilde{A}_{j}^{u} } \right) \), which are movie characteristics and perceived unobservable appeal by the studio.

1.1.1 Advertising Expenditure

We assume for a wide release movie, the advertising expenditure is decided by

$$ Ad_{j} = \alpha + \beta_{1} X_{j} + \beta_{2} \tilde{A}_{j}^{u} + \varepsilon_{j} $$

where Ad j is the advertising expenditure for wide release movie j. Note that we have no observation on studio’s perceived unobservable appeal \( \tilde{A}_{j}^{u} \). Instead, we know \( A_{j}^{u} \) through our demand estimation. Therefore, we can write the equation as

$$ Ad_{j} = \alpha + \beta_{1} X_{j} + \beta_{2} A_{j}^{u} + \chi_{j} $$

where \( \chi_{j} = (\beta_{2} \varepsilon_{{\tilde{A}j}} + \varepsilon_{j} ) \), where \( \varepsilon_{{\tilde{A}j}} \sim N\left( {0,\sigma_{{\tilde{A}}}^{2} } \right) \). Therefore, χ j is still i.i.d. normal distribution with mean zero.

1.1.2 Number of Theatres Engaged

We define two regressions for the opening week and the following weeks separately. This is because the number of theatres in the opening week is often determined based on expected demand, while in the following weeks, the number of theatres is driven largely by the last week’s performance (Elberse and Eliashberg 2003; Krider et al. 2005). Therefore, we have

$$ \log (Theatre_{j1} ) = \alpha_{1} + \beta_{10} X_{j} + \beta_{11} \tilde{A}_{j}^{u} + \beta_{12} Ad_{j} + \beta_{13} Season_{j1} + \varepsilon_{j1} $$

for the opening week, and

$$ \log (Theatre_{jt} ) = \alpha_{2} + \beta_{21} X_{j} + \beta_{22} \tilde{A}_{j}^{u} + \beta_{23} Ad_{j} + \beta_{24} \log (BO_{jt - 1} ) + \beta_{25} Age_{jt} + \varepsilon_{jt} $$

for the following weeks, where Season j1 is a vector of month and holiday variables for opening week and BO jt−1 is the box office revenue for movie j in the last week. By a similar argument to that for advertising, we rewrite the equations as

$$ \log (Theatre_{j1} ) = \alpha_{1} + \beta_{10} X_{j} + \beta_{11} A_{j}^{u} + \beta_{12} Ad_{j} + \nu_{j1} $$
$$ \log (Theatre_{jt} ) = \alpha_{2} + \beta_{21} X_{j} + \beta_{22} \tilde{A}_{j}^{u} + \beta_{23} Ad_{j} + \beta_{24} \log (BO_{jt - 1} ) + \beta_{25} Age_{jt} + \nu_{jt} $$

where \( \nu_{j1} = (\beta_{11} \varepsilon_{{\tilde{A}j}} + \varepsilon_{j1} ) \) and \( \nu_{jt} = (\beta_{22} \varepsilon_{{\tilde{A}j}} + \varepsilon_{jt} ) \), which are i.i.d. normal distribution with mean zero.

1.1.3 Movie life period

The length of a movie’s theatre run under wide release is defined according to the number of theatres engaged. We assume that a movie is out of the market when the predicted number of theatres is less than 95, which is the mean of the observed number of theatres in the last week across all movies in our initial sample.

We estimate the above regression equations using observations of the wide release movies in the sample and therefore predict those variables for the platform movies. In addition, we restrict the number of theatres engaged in the opening week as the minimum between the regression prediction and the actual observation when the platform movies reach national release.

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Chen, X., Chen, Y. & Weinberg, C.B. Learning about movies: the impact of movie release types on the nationwide box office. J Cult Econ 37, 359–386 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10824-012-9189-z

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