Abstract
It is widely assumed that children with autism have a diminished understanding of the perception-knowledge relationship, as a specific manifestation of a theory of mind (ToM) impairment. However, such a conclusion may not be justified on the basis of previous studies, which have suffered from significant methodological weaknesses. The current study aimed to avoid such problems by adopting more stringent participant matching methods, using a larger sample (N = 80), and implementing a new, more rigorous control task in order to ensure that non-ToM task factors were not confounding results. After excluding children who failed the control task, it was found that children with autism were moderately impaired in their understanding of the perception-knowledge relationship, relative to age- and verbal ability matched comparison children.
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Notes
Neither Leslie and Frith (1988) nor Perner et al. (1989) reported verbal IQ scores in their papers. However, we estimated the mean group VIQs from the VMAs and CAs reported in Leslie and Frith’s Table 1 and Perner et al.’s Table 2, using the formula: VIQ = (VMA/CA) × 100. These calculations indicated that the autistic and SLI groups had mean VIQs of approximately 52 and 78, respectively, in Leslie and Frith’s study, and approximately 54 and 78, respectively, in Perner et al.’s study.
A Statement of Special Education Needs is a document, based on an assessment by the local authority, which provides a detailed description of any special needs (e.g., ASD, intellectual disability, dyslexia, etc.), including diagnostic information and a developmental history.
Given that one of the cells had an expected count of less than 5, a Fisher’s exact probability test was used rather than a chi-square test.
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Acknowledgments
This research was supported by a City University Ph.D. Studentship awarded to the first author. This manuscript was prepared during a Mentor-Based Postdoctoral Fellowship awarded to the authors by Autism Speaks. We would like to thank the following schools for their participation in this research: Bensham Manor, Brent Knoll, Hillingdon Manor, Kilmorie, Linden Bridge, Southmead, Pendragon, St. Winifred’s, The Park, and West Wimbledon. Finally, we are extremely grateful to Dr David Williams, Dr Sebastian Gaigg, Professor Chris Jarrold, and the anonymous reviewers of this manuscript for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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Lind, S.E., Bowler, D.M. Impaired Performance on See-Know Tasks Amongst Children with Autism: Evidence of Specific Difficulties with Theory of Mind or Domain-General Task Factors?. J Autism Dev Disord 40, 479–484 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-009-0889-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-009-0889-y