Abstract
The policy of choice to fight tax non-compliance is an increase in deterrence, i.e. fines and audits, which seems to be well-grounded theoretically as the economics of crime justifies such an increase of the expected costs of illegal activities. In this paper, the impact of subjectively perceived deterrence on undeclared work is analyzed for the German case. Germany is particularly interesting because it considerably increased deterrence to fight tax non-compliance recently. The data set used for this analysis contains several waves of survey data conducted between 2004 and 2008. According to our evidence, (subjectively perceived) deterrence has an impact on undeclared work, but the influence of social norms is similarly important.
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Feld, L.P., Larsen, C. Self-perceptions, government policies and tax compliance in Germany. Int Tax Public Finance 19, 78–103 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-011-9196-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-011-9196-6