Abstract
International bureaucracies influence global governance processes as independent agents. Biermann and Siebenhüner (Managers of global change: the influence of international environmental bureaucracies. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2009) have developed an analytical framework to measure and explain the degree of autonomous influence of bureaucracies. We test the validity of the causal claims in the framework by applying it to the Division for Sustainable Development, the bureaucracy that services the Commission on Sustainable Development and compare the results with existing applications of the framework to the United Nations Environmental Program and the Climate Secretariat (UNFCCC). The test shows that the framework is comprehensive and captures the main elements of bureaucratic influence. The structure of the explanatory variables, however, as well as some causal claims, needs to be improved. For instance, the framework includes too many explanatory variables, and interplay between the variables is not taken into account. The article suggests five concrete measures to improve the framework by, for example, creating protocols, collapsing variables, and introduce weightings to the variables.
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Notes
Ronald Mitchell’s International Environmental Agreements Database contains over 1,100 multilateral and more than 1,500 bilateral international environmental agreements. At least 310 bureaucracies oversee the implementation these agreements (see: http://iea.uoregon.edu).
For more elaboration, please see Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009, pp. 15–74).
As this form of support is part of the bureaucracy’s mandate, it could be argued that the perceived level and quality of the assistance is a measure for effectiveness. However, given the discretion that the bureaucracy can exercise in effectuating this task it is argued here that it can be seen as a valid indicator for autonomous influence.
See footnote 3: The bureaucracy’s mandate leaves room for discretion, and thus for autonomous influence.
For an extended discussion on problem structure and its influence on regimes see: Miles et al. (2002). pp. 15–23.
Several interviewees requested to stay anonymous. We have therefore done our utmost to avoid revealing any identities or country of origin.
Data on downloads and page views were provided to the authors by staff members at the DSD.
Seven million visitors for the UNFCCC homepage should be considered a conservative number. In 2009, the number of visitors to the homepage exploded to nearly 27 million only to decrease to more normal levels around 9–10 million in the post-Copenhagen period. See: http://unfccc.int/home/items/3358.php.
It turned out to be notoriously difficult to get interviewees to say anything but seemingly appropriate things about the leadership; however, we received no indication that people were unhappy with the Director.
Please note that our research excludes the legacy of Dr. Tariq Banuri who headed the DSD from 2008 to 2011 and his replacement, Nikhil Seth.
Data on homepage visits and downloads from the DSD have been provided by staff members. For the UNFCCC, see http://unfccc.int/home/items/3358.php.
Since the data collection was made, the DSD has undergone large changes following the 20th session of the CSD, also referred to as Rio + 20. The DSD has also undergone leadership changes. Nevertheless, we argue that these developments are irrelevant for our prime aim, namely to test the analytical framework of Biermann and Siebenhüner. The results can also be viewed as a baseline for future research on the performance of the DSD.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank all the people participating in our interviews and survey, in particular the DSD staff and Jakob Ström from the Swedish Permanent Mission to the United Nations. We would also like to thank Philipp Pattberg and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions of this article. Finally, we would like to thank Will Barnes for his editing.
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Widerberg, O., van Laerhoven, F. Measuring the autonomous influence of an international bureaucracy: the Division for Sustainable Development. Int Environ Agreements 14, 303–327 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-014-9249-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-014-9249-2