Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Multi-level and multi-arena governance: the limits of integration and the possibilities of forum shopping

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Global governance occurs through a large number of issue-area regimes that constitute multiple arenas of governance at multiple levels. This paper draws upon established literature from public administration to show that such fragmentation is unavoidable, because it occurs even in governance at the national level. Moreover, while such fragmentation undoubtedly carries with it problems, it also brings advantages, such as redundancy which makes it less likely that blame avoidance will result in issues being overlooked. The existence of multiple arenas also makes possible the phenomenon of ‘forum shopping’, which allows entrepreneurial actors to advance (or block) the development of international agreements. Using primarily examples from environmental governance, but with some comparative examples from other issue areas, this paper reflects upon both the threats and opportunities this reality presents, suggesting that the prevailing fragmentation of governance at once presents not just an obstacle to global governance, but opportunities for improving global governance—opportunities that would not occur if a single regime enjoyed a monopoly on governing capacity.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. In discussing climate change, it has become fashionable to attribute the expression ‘minilateralism’ to Naim (2009). In fact, the term has been in use for more than two decades, and the earliest reference appears to be that by Richardson (1988).

  2. Other features making ‘governance’ a useful concept are the use of non-state actors to provide governance functions and governance in an increasingly globalised world, where it occurs in the absence of government (Kjær 2004).

  3. Prost and Clark (2006). See also: Helfer (2009), Alter and Meunier (2009), Drezner (2009).

Abbreviations

ACAP:

Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels

APP:

Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate

CCAMLR:

Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources

COP:

Conference of the parties

EU:

European Union

FDI:

Foreign direct investment

G20:

Group of 20 major economies

G8:

Group of Eight (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom and United States)

G8+5:

G8+5 climate change dialogue, consisting of the Group of Eight plus the ‘outreach five’ (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa)

GATT:

General agreement on Tariffs and Trade

IGO:

Intergovernmental organization

ILO:

International Labour Organization

MAI:

Multilateral Agreement on Investment

MARPOL:

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships

MEA:

Multilateral environmental agreement

NGO:

Nongovernmental organization

OAU:

Organization of African Unity

OECD:

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

UN:

United Nations

UNCCD:

United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification

UNCHE:

United Nations Conference on the Human Environment

UNEP:

United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO:

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFCCC:

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

US:

United States

USEPA:

United States Environmental Protection Agency

WTO:

World Trade Organization

References

  • Alter, K. J., & Meunier, S. (2009). The politics of international regime complexity. Perspectives on Politics, 7(1), 13–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (1991). Agenda dynamics and policy subsystems. Journal of Politics, 53(4), 1044–1074.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chambers, W. B. (2008). Interlinkages and effectiveness of multilateral environmental agreements. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Christoff, P., & Eckersley, R. (2007). The Kyoto Protocol and the Asia Pacific partnership on clean development and climate. In T. Bonyhady & P. Christoff (Eds.), Climate law in Australia. Sydney: Federation Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Commoner, B. (1971). The closing circle: Nature, man, and technology. New York: Knopf.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cornford, J. P. (1974). Review: The illusion of decision. British Journal of Political Science, 4(2), 231–243.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davis, S. K. (2001). The politics of water scarcity in the western states. Social Science Journal, 38(4), 527–542.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Drezner, D. W. (2009). The power and peril of international regime complexity. Perspectives on Politics, 7(1), 65–70.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dudley, G., & Richardson, J. (1996). Why does policy change over time? Adversarial policy communities, alternative policy arenas, and British trunk roads policy 1945–95. Journal of European Public Policy, 3(1), 63–83.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Florini, A., & Sovacool, B. K. (2011). Bridging the gaps in global energy governance. Global Governance, 17, 57–74.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gehring, T., & Oberthür, S. (2008). Interplay: Exploring institutional interaction. In O. R. Young, L. King, & H. Schroeder (Eds.), Institutions and environmental change: Principal findings, applications and research frontiers. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guiraudon, V. (2000). European integration and migration policy: Vertical policy-making as venue shopping. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(2), 251–271.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haas, P. M. (1990). Obtaining international environmental protection through epistemic consensus. Millennium, 23, 669–700.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haas, P. M. (2004). When does power listen to truth? A constructivist approach to the policy process. Journal of European Public Policy, 11, 569–592.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hansen, K. N., & Krejci, D. T. (2000). Rethinking neoinstitutional interaction: municipal arena-specific strategies and the base closure process. Administration and Society, 32(2), 166–182.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Helfer, L. R. (2009). Regime shifting in the intellectual property system. Perspectives on Politics, 7(1), 39–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hof, A. F., den Elzen, M. G. J., & van Vuuren, D. P. (2009). Environmental effectiveness and economic consequences of fragmented versus universal regimes: What can we learn from model studies? International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 9, 39–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hood, C. C. (1976). The limits of administration. London: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kellow, A. (1999). International toxic risk management: Ideals, interests and implementation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kellow, A. (2006). A new process for negotiating multilateral environmental agreements? The Asia Pacific climate partnership beyond Kyoto. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60, 287–303.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kellow, A. (2010). Is the Asia-Pacific partnership a viable alternative to Kyoto? Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 1(1), 10–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kellow, A., & Zito, A. R. (2002). Steering through complexity: EU environmental regulation in the international context. Political Studies, 50, 43–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kjær, A. (2004). Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuziemko, I., & Werker, E. (2006). How much is a seat on the security council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations. Journal of Political Economy, 114(5), 905–930.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lachowski, Z. (1998). The ban on anti-personnel mines. SIPRI Yearbook, 1998, 545–558.

    Google Scholar 

  • Landau, M. (1969). Redundancy, rationality, and the problem of duplication and overlap. Public Administration Review, 29, 346–358.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Landau, M. (1991). On multiorganizational systems in public administration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 1, 5–18.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindblom, C. E. (1959). The science of ‘muddling through’. Public Administration Review, 19, 79–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lindblom, C. E. (1979). Still muddling, not yet through. Public Administration Review, 39, 517–526.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lowenfeld, A. F. (1997). Forum shopping, antisuit injunctions, negative declarations, and related tools of international litigation. American Journal of International Law, 91(2), 314–324.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lowi, T. J. (1964). American business, public policy, case-studies, and political theory. World Politics, 16(4), 677–715.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McGee, J., & Taplin, R. (2006). The Asia-Pacific partnership on clean development and climate: A complement or competitor to the Kyoto Protocol? Global Change Peace & Security, 18(3), 173–192.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McKenzie, R. B., & Tullock, G. (1975). The new world of economics: Explorations into human experience. Homewood, Ill: Richard D. Irwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyer-Bisch, P. (2001). Social actors and sovereignty in IGOs. International Social Science Journal, 53(4), 611–619.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell, R. B. (1998). Discourse and sovereignty: Interests, science and morality in the regulation of whaling. Global Governance, 4, 275–293.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moravcsik, A. (1999). A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation. International Organization, 53(2), 267–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Naim, M. (2009). Minilateralism: The magic number to get real international action. Foreign Policy, 173, 135–136.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nielsson, G. P. (1978). The parallel national action process: Scandinavian experiences. In P. Taylor & A. J. R. Groom (Eds.), International organisation: A conceptual approach. London: Frances Pinter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oberthür, S. (2009). Interplay management: Enhancing environmental policy integration among international institutions. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 9, 371–391.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Orsini, A., Morin, J.-F., & Young, O. (forthcoming). Regime complexes: A buzz, a boom, or a boost for global governance? Special Issue of Global Governance.

  • Prins, G., & Rayner, S. (2007). Time to ditch Kyoto. Nature, 449, 973–975.

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Prost, M., & Clark, P. K. (2006). Unity, diversity and the fragmentation of international law: How much does the multiplication of international organizations really matter? Chinese Journal of International Law, 5, 341–370.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raustiala, K., & Victor, D. G. (2004). The regime complex for plant genetic resources. International Organization, 58, 277–309.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Richardson, J. J. (1981). Problems of controlling public sector agencies: The case of Norwegian oil policy. Political Studies, 29, 35–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Richardson, J. D. (1988). International coordination of trade policy. In M. Feldstein (Ed.), International economic cooperation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheingate, A. D. (2000). Agricultural retrenchment revisited: Issue definition and venue change in the United States and European Union. Governance, 13(3), 335–363.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Slaughter, A.-M. (2004). A new world order: Government networks and the disaggregated state. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smythe, E. (1998). Your place or mine? States, international organizations and the negotiation of investment rules. Transnational Corporations, 7(3), 85–120.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sprinz, D., & Vaahtoranta, T. (1994). The interest-based explanation of international environmental policy. International Organization, 48, 77–105.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stokke, O. S. (2001). The interplay of international regimes. Putting effectiveness theory to work. Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI Report 14/2001).

  • Tarullo, D.-K. (2000). Norms and institutions in global competition policy. American Journal of International Law, 94(3), 478–504.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Underdal, A. (1980). The politics of international fisheries management: The case of the North-East Atlantic. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogel, D. (1997). Trading up and governing across: Transnational governance and environmental protection. Journal of European Public Policy, 4, 556–571.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weaver, R. K. (1987). The politics of blame avoidance. Washington: Brookings.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiler, J. H. H. (1988). The white paper and the application of community law. In R. Beiber, D. Dehousse, J. Pinder, & J. H. H. Weiler (Eds.), One European market?. Nomos: Baden-Baden.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wendon, B. (1998). The commission as image-venue entrepreneur in EU social policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 5(2), 339–353.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Young, O. R. (1996). Institutional linkages in international society: Polar perspectives. Global Governance, 2, 1–23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Young, O. R. (1999). Comment on Andrew Moravcsik, ‘A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation. International Organization, 53(4), 805–809.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zelli, F. (2011). The fragmentation of the global climate governance architecture. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change, 2, 255–270.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Howard Bamsey, Peter Carroll, Richard Eccleston, Rob Hall; nMarcus Haward, Matt Killingsworth, David Mason, Hannah Murphy, Bob Reinalda, Matt Sussex. Arild Underdal, Oran Young and two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Government, University of Tasmania, Hobart, TAS, Australia

    Aynsley Kellow

Authors
  1. Aynsley Kellow
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Aynsley Kellow.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Kellow, A. Multi-level and multi-arena governance: the limits of integration and the possibilities of forum shopping. Int Environ Agreements 12, 327–342 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-012-9172-3

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-012-9172-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation