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Analysis of the governance architecture to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping

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Abstract

Despite the substantial and likely increasing contribution of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from international shipping and the related adverse impacts on global climate change, GHG emissions from international shipping are yet neither regulated by the Kyoto Protocol, nor through any other legally binding, internationally accepted regulation. This paper is looking into the governance architecture that is currently in place to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping with a view to analyze whether the institutional degree of fragmentation within this architecture is contributing to the current situation where no legally binding, internationally accepted regulation has been set up yet. Following the hypothesis that the degree and the characteristics of governance fragmentation have a crucial impact on the effectiveness and performance of a governance system, this paper focuses on the current architecture of climate change governance in international shipping and the institutional interplay between its actors. Therefore, the analytical framework builds on approaches from international environmental governance, regime theory, institutional interplay, and fragmentation in international governance architectures.

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Notes

  1. International shipping is defined as shipping between ports of different countries. Domestic shipping is defined as shipping between ports of the same country. Military and fishing vessels are excluded from both definitions. International shipping carries over 80% of global trade by volume (UNCTAD 2009).

  2. The overall average annual growth in tonne-miles from 1979 to 2007 was 4.1%, while the world economic growth (GDP) rose on average by 3.4% per year (UNCTAD 2009).

  3. Governance architecture is defined as the “overarching system of public and private institutions that are valid or active in a given issue-area of world politics.” It can comprise organizations, regimes, and other forms of principles, norms, regulations, and decision-making procedures (Biermann et al. 2009a, b, pp. 24–25).

  4. See for example Biermann et al. (2009a).

  5. For an overview, consider: Young et al. (1999/2005), Biermann et al. (2009a).

  6. See for instance: International Chamber of Shipping, MEPC (2010a); World Shipping Council, MEPC (2010b); and Intertanko, MEPC (2009).

  7. As of 31.12.2010, the IMO Convention has been ratified by 169 States (97.34% of the world tonnage).

  8. As of 31.12.2010 the UNFCCC has been ratified by 193 States and 1 regional economic integration organization (European Union).

  9. The public awareness and media attention on this issue is yet still moderate, however, a coalition of environmental NGOs, led by World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Greenpeace International stated in their submission to the MEPC (MEPC 60/4/53), that a “lack of progress in MEPC is likely to lead to an increased (and more hostile) media and NGO focus on the shipping industry.”

  10. In its resolution A.963(23), the IMO Assembly urges the MEPC to identify and develop the mechanism or mechanisms needed to achieve the limitation or reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping (IMO 2004).

  11. As of 31.12.2010, MARPOL 73/78 (Annex VI—on Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships) has been ratified by 62 governments (84.93% of the world tonnage).

  12. This is reflected in the underlying principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) in Article 3.1 of the Convention.

  13. See: COP Decision 4/CP.1.

  14. As of 31.12.2010, the Kyoto Protocol is ratified by 190 governments.

  15. On the role of member-states in UN institutions, see Keohane et al. (1993); for a detailed overview on the role of state sovereignty for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes, see for instance Haas et al. (1993).

  16. UNCLOS, Part VII, Article 90, 91. A flag state has to establish and enforce international regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment (UNCLOS 1983, Part VII, Article 211).

  17. See for example: ENB (2009, 2010a, b), UNFCCC (2009a, b, 2010), and MEPC (2008a, 2010c).

  18. Consider IMO documents (MEPC 2008a, 2010c).

  19. See for example: ENB (2009, 2010a, b), UNFCCC (2009a, b, 2010).

  20. Consider UNFCCC documents: UNFCCC (2009a, paragraphs 135–138), UNFCCC (2009b, paragraphs 135–138), UNFCCC (2009c, 2010).

  21. For instance: Miles et al. (2002), Young et al. (1999/2005), Biermann et al. (2009).

  22. This definition is according to Krasner (1983). International regimes are defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”

  23. Young (1996, 3).

  24. For instance: Young (1999b, 259).

  25. See for example: Young (2008, 16).

  26. Underdal (2002a, 5–6). See also: Andresen (2007).

  27. See for instance: Young (2002), Andresen (2007), Gehring and Oberthür (2008).

  28. Young (2002) refers to this situation of institutional interplay as horizontal interplay.

  29. See for example Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law (2006). Boyle (2007) and MEPC (2008b).

  30. Gehring and Oberthür (2008) refer to the constellation where member-states can exploit an ambiguous institutional architecture to pursue their own interests as “forum shopping.”

  31. See for example: ENB (2009, 2010a, b), UNFCCC (2009a, b, 2010).

  32. See for instance: Oberthür (2003), Faber et al. (2010), Miola et al. (2010).

  33. See for example IMO document MEPC (2010d), Faber et al. (2010), and Miola et al. (2010).

  34. For further information and details on the ten proposals, consider MEPC (2010d).

  35. See for example: ENB (2009, 2010a, b), UNFCCC (2009a, b, 2010).

  36. MEPC (2008a, 2010c), ENB (2009, 2010a, b), and UNFCCC (2009a, b, 2010).

Abbreviations

BAP:

Bali action plan

CBDR:

Common but differentiated responsibilities

CO2 :

Carbon dioxide

COP:

Conference of the parties

ENB:

Earth negotiations bulletin

GDP:

Gross domestic product

GHG:

Greenhouse gas

IMO:

International maritime organization

KP:

Kyoto protocol

MEPC:

Marine environment protection committee

SBSTA:

Subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice

UN:

United Nations

UNCLOS:

United Nations convention on the law of the sea

UNCTAD:

United Nations conference on trade and development

UNFCCC:

United Nations framework convention on climate change

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The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their very constructive and detailed comments that helped to improve the manuscript.

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  1. Ecological Economics, Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, 26111, Oldenburg, Germany

    Bernd Hackmann

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Hackmann, B. Analysis of the governance architecture to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping. Int Environ Agreements 12, 85–103 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-011-9155-9

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