Abstract
The article concerns a mediaeval Indian debate over whether, and if so how, we can know that a self (ātman) exists, understood here as a subject of cognition (jñātṛ) that outlives individual cognitions, being their common substrate. A passage that has not yet been translated from Sanskrit into a European language, from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjarī (c. 890 CE), ‘Blossoms of Reasoning’, is examined. This rich passage reveals something not yet noted in secondary literature, namely that Mīmāṃsakas advanced four different models of what happens when the self perceives itself. The article clarifies the differences between the four, and the historical and logical relationships between them. It also hypothesizes pressures that constituted the need for the creation of the newer views, i.e. perceived problems with the earlier views, which the proponents of the newer views saw themselves as overcoming.
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Notes
The section dealing with this question of whether the self can be perceived runs from Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 267,7 to p. 275,18 and has not, to my knowledge, been translated into a European language. It has however, along with the whole of the rest of the Nyāyamañjarī, been translated into Gujarati (Shah 1992), a language of which I unfortunately do not even have an elementary grasp. It has also been summarized by Shah (1997, pp. 95–99) and Sinha (1934, pp. 226–230). In this and subsequent footnotes, numbers coming immediately after a comma are line numbers, and ‘b’ after a line number means: counting from the bottom of the page.
My critical edition of this section of the Nyāyamañjarī (Watson forthcoming) shows that Jayanta’s elaboration of the four views echoes the wording of the following texts: (1) Ślokavārttika, ātmavāda 115–120, 130, 137; (2) Ślokavārttika, śūnyavāda 68; (3) Umbeka’s Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā ad śūnyavāda 70 (pp. 257–258); (4) Prabhākara’s Bṛhatī p. 64,2–5.
The source passages for views 2 and 3 were identified already by Nagin Shah and placed in his 1972 edition of Cakradhara’s commentary, the Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga. Jayanta’s fourth view has been mentioned in some secondary literature, but has not, in my view, been correctly identified there. Sinha (1934, pp. 228–230) regards it as the view of Śaṅkara. Taber (1990, p. 53, note 9) states that it is ‘perhaps known to [Jayanta] more from the writings of the Kashmīri Śaiva philosophers than the Advaita Vedāntins’. Sasaki (1996) sees it as the view of Śaṅkara. See the appendix to this article for the evidence that it was known to Jayanta as the view of Prabhākara.
For some information about which Naiyāyikas held the self to be imperceptible and which regarded it as perceptible, see Watson (2006, pp. 131–132, note 25).
Nyāyasūtra 1.1.10 and Nyāyabhāṣya ad loc.
Vaiśeṣikasūtra 3.2.4.
Praśastapādabhāṣya pp. 14,14–16,7.
But a complication needs to be mentioned. Vaiśeṣikasūtra 9.13 reads: ātmany ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam, ‘Direct perception of the self occurs as a result of a particular conjunction in the self of internal organ and self’. For a detailed discussion of this sūtra and its citations, see Isaacson (1993). Although all of its earliest commentators and quoters take it as referring to yogic perception, Isaacson (1993) points out that neither yoga nor yogic perception is mentioned in this or the surrounding Vaiśeṣikasūtras, and hence that it is not to be altogether ruled out that originally it was intended as a description of the perception of ordinary people.
For more detail, see Watson (2006, pp. 131–132, note 25).
The Vṛttikāra gives his Buddhist interlocutor the final word in the discussion of all of the following Nyāya arguments for the self: that from the requirement for a possessor of pleasure and such like, that based on the need to postulate an agent of cognition in order to account for the linguistic usage “he/she cognizes”, that from desire, and that from memory (Śābarabhāṣya pp. 50,13–56,6).
Kumārila introduces his commentary on this part of the Śābarabhāṣya with the words parair abhigatān pūrvam ātmahetūn nirasyati (Ślokavārttika, ātmavāda 92ab), ‘The author first refutes the inferences of the self brought forward by others (i.e. Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas)’. So he explicitly sees these Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika arguments as ‘refuted’ by Buddhist arguments. He gives the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika inferences (verses 92cd–100), responds to them with Buddhist arguments (101–106), and then states (107):
hetuṣv evaṃ parokteṣu pratiṣiddheṣu samprati |
ahampratyayavijñeyaḥ svayam ātmopapādyate ||
‘The inferences taught by others (i.e. Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas) having been repudiated in this way, the self is now ascertained as that which is known by itself through I-cognition’. It is clear, then, that for Kumārila these Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika inferences can be dismissed by Buddhist arguments.
Śābarabhāṣya pp. 56,7–58,12. Ślokavārttika, ātmavāda verses 107–136. See Taber’s (1990) article on the subject.
Nyāyamañjarī Vol.2, p. 270,13; Watson (forthcoming, §2.3.2).
Nyāyamañjarī Vol.2, p. 271,3–4; Watson (forthcoming, §2.3.2).
śiśava evaṃ pratāryante, na prāmāṇikāḥ (Nyāyamañjarī Vol.2, p. 274,2; Watson [forthcoming, §2.5.2]).
And it is not unnatural that he nevertheless directed more aggression towards Umbeka than Kumārila. The phenomenon of ‘displaced aggression’ is well attested, in which if the source of the hurt is a senior, one directs the resultant aggression at a safer, i.e. junior or equal, but related target.
tatra pratyakṣam ātmānam aupavarṣāḥ prapedire |
ahampratyayagamyatvāt (Vol. 2, p. 268,6–7; Watson [forthcoming, §2.2]).
For Kumārila’s identification of Upavarṣa and the Vṛttikāra, see Gurjar’s (1937, pp. 104–107) discussion of Tantravārttika 2.3.16; for Umbeka’s, see Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā ad pratyakṣa 13, and Kataoka (2011a, p. 55, note 107).
While there is a lot of evidence that the two names refer to the same person (see Gurjar 1937), the one piece of counter-evidence is that within the Śābarabhāṣya’s Vṛttikāra section itself is a mention of ‘bhagavān Upavarṣa’. It is indeed unlikely that someone would refer to themselves using such a title, and thus Jacobi (1911, p. 17) argued that Upavarṣa must have been different and ‘considerably older than’ the Vṛttikāra. (He suggested that the latter was Bodhāyana; Nakamura [1983, p. 391] followed him in that.) But as Keith (1921, p. 8) and Gurjar (1937, p. 100) argued, the mention of bhagavān Upavarṣa within the Vṛttikāra section ceases to be an obstacle to their being equated if one holds that Śabara is not giving an exact quotation of the Vṛttikāra’s commentary, but a summary, in which he occasionally switches to his own voice, mentioning its author by name. For evidence that he is summarizing rather than quoting, see Keith (1921, p. 8), Gurjar (1937, p. 98–99) and Taber (2005, p. 176, note 2).
See Kataoka (2011a, p. 71) for a table showing the position of thirteen scholars regarding the identities of the Vṛttikāra and Upavarṣa.
There is some controversy surrounding the extent of the Śābarabhāṣya’s Vṛttikāra section, which begins after Śabara has given his own commentary on Mīmāṃsāsūtras 1.1.1–5. For the purposes of this article I am assuming the view of, among others, Ganganatha Jha (1933, pp. 9–10)—namely that it runs from p. 24,16 to p. 60,25 (of Frauwallner’s edition), i.e. that it includes all of the second round of comments on sūtras 1.1.3–5. It deals with various philosophical topics including a rejection of the existence of God and a defence of the mind-independence of the world against Buddhist idealism (Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda). (The part concerned with the self runs from p. 50,1 to p. 60,22; and, within that, the section that argues that the self is perceived is on pp. 56,7–58,12.)
The argument against this view is that Kumārila seems to attribute most of this passage—all apart from the very beginning portion which he expounds in the ten verses of the vṛttikāragrantha, Ślokavārttika (Madras edition)—to Śabara, not the Vṛttikāra. Maṇḍanamiśra, on the other hand, seems to think that the Vṛttikāra section covers this whole passage. The matter is not solved yet, but weighing in favour of the section extending beyond where Kumārila seems to think are the following two considerations first put forward by Jacobi (1911, pp. 15–16): If the Vṛttikāra section only extended as far as Kumārila seems to claim (including only part of the commentary on 1.1.4), then (1) Śabara would not have inserted it where he did (after his own commentary on 1.1.5), but earlier, after his commentary on (the first part of) 1.1.4; (2) we are left with the surprizing situation of Śabara commenting twice on part of 1.1.4 and all of 1.1.5, with there being no indication of why he comments on it twice in different ways. In other words, this sequence is natural:
1.1.1Ś, 1.1.2Ś, 1.1.3Ś, 1.1.4Ś, 1.1.5Ś, 1.1.3VK, 1.1.4VK, 1.1.5VK;
whereas this, for both of the just mentioned reasons, is inexplicable:
1.1.1Ś, 1.1.2Ś, 1.1.3Ś, 1.1.4Ś, 1.1.5Ś, 1.1.3VK, 1.1.4aVK, 1.1.4bŚ2, 1.1.5Ś2.
Still, how can we explain Kumārila’s view? (1) Jacobi (1911, p. 16) makes some suggestions. (2) There are two pieces of evidence for attributing to Kumārila the view that the Vṛttikāra section includes only that part commented on in the ten verses of the so-called vṛttikāragrantha: (A) Ślokavārttika, nirālambanavāda 16cd (bāhyārthasadasadbhāve yatno bhāṣyakṛtā kṛtāḥ), where Kumārila names the ‘author of the Bhāṣya’, i.e. Śabara, as the person who has engaged in the question of the existence or non-existence of external objects in the nirālambanavāda section of the Śābarabhāṣya. (B) Ślokavārttika, nirālambanavāda 29ab (bhāṣyakāreṇa dattam uttaram), where Kumārila names the ‘author of the Bhāṣya’, i.e. Śabara, as the person who has given a certain answer in the nirālambanavāda section of the Śābarabhāṣya. These are what have been taken to imply that in Kumārila’s view Śabara takes back over from the Vṛttikāra at the beginning of the nirālambanavāda section of the Śābarabhāṣya and gives his own view. But note Taber’s (2005, p. 176, note 2) observation that Kumārila may just have meant that the Vṛttikāra’s views are being employed by Śabara/that Śabara is presenting his own view using the words and arguments of the Vṛttikāra.
Even if we accept that the Vṛttikāra section cannot have included only the part of the Śābarabhāṣya commented on by Kumārila in the so-called vṛttikāragrantha, do we have to hold that it continued all the way through to the end of the ātmavāda section? Jacobi (1911) and Keith (1921, p. 8) assented to the former but not the latter. But their reason for thinking that the Vṛttikāra section ended before the ātmavāda section was presumably that they were following the Biblioteca Indica edition of the Śābarabhāṣya which has it end with the words Bādarāyaṇagrahaṇam uktam. And Gurjar (1937, pp. 98–99) has plausibly shown that those words do not indicate the end of the Vṛttikāra section, but are best construed as Śabara interjecting a sentence of his own in the middle of his summary of the Vṛttikāra’s commentary.
In short, the matter is still not certain,* and I am assuming in this article that the ātmavāda section of the Śābarabhāṣya belongs within the Vṛttikāra summary, not because that is in any way beyond doubt, but because there seems to be slightly more evidence pointing in that direction than in the other.
* Two sources dealing with this issue that I have not been able to benefit much from, owing to my lack of Japanese, are Teraishi (1997) and Kataoka (2011a).
Verses 107–136.
That the immediate source for Jayanta’s exposition of this view is Kumārila rather than the Vṛttikāra is indicated primarily by the fact that his wording follows the Ślokavārttika more closely than the Śābarabhāṣya, but also perhaps by the way that he begins this section with aupavarṣāḥ prapedire (‘the followers of Upavarṣa maintain …’). For it would be strange for a view of the Vṛttikāra to be attributed to ‘followers of the Vṛttikāra’. But it would not be strange to refer to Kumārila in that way.
Jayanta does not indicate that he sees the proponent of the second view as someone different from that of the first. He frames it not with a clear change of speaker, but with the words yac ca … kṛtam, tad anupapannam: ‘As for [the philosophical move] that has been made, namely … that is inadmissible’. The third view is introduced with a speaker change: ‘And as for what is said by he who considers himself clever’ (yad api nipuṇaṃmanyair ucyate). The fourth view is introduced with the words ‘But others maintain/another person maintains’ (apare punar āhuḥ).
I said above that Jayanta most likely intends aupavarṣāḥ to mean ‘followers of the teachings of Upavarṣa’ and that he probably took Upavarṣa to be the Vṛttikāra. But the commentator on the Nyāyamañjarī, Cakradhara, understands the label to mean simply ‘Mīmāṃsakas’ (aupavarṣā mīmāṃsakāḥ). Whichever of these two is correct, i.e. whether Jayanta intended the label to include all Mīmāṃsakas or to refer only to those Mīmāṃsakas who followed the teachings of the Vṛttikāra, it is quite possible that the sentence in which he uses the expression (‘The Aupavarṣas maintain that the self is directly perceptible, because it can be perceived by I-cognition’) is intended to refer not only the first view, but the first three, all of which concern themselves with I-cognition as a means of perceiving the self. The fourth view is not concerned with I-cognition, but with ‘self-luminosity’ (svayaṃprakāśa) and self-awareness (svasaṃvedana). (The Vṛttikāra in fact uses the terminology of both: see na cāhampratyayo vyāmoha iti śakyate vaktum [p. 56,18], svasaṃvedyaḥ sa bhavati [p. 56,24] and svayaṃjyotiṣṭvavacanāt [p. 58,11].) On the many differences between I-cognition and self-awareness, see Watson (2010, pp. 303–310).
There are some publications by Koki Sasaki in Japanese, related to the topic of this article, that I unfortunately have not been able to make proper use of owing to my ignorance of that language, despite its importance for the study of Classical Indian Philosophy, for example Sasaki (1993), (1994a), (1994b) and (1996). The first of those is specifically on this topic of śabdamātroccāraṇa.
On one occasion Jayanta phrases it as jñātavān aham evādāv aham evādya vedmi ca, and on another as aham eva hyo jñātavān, aham evādya jānāmi (Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 269,2 and 269,8; both occur in §2.2 of Watson [forthcoming]). Jayanta is clearly basing himself, particularly in the first of these, on Kumārila’s jñātavān aham evedaṃ puredānīṃ ca vedmy aham (Ślokavārttika, ātmavāda 116ab). Kumārila is there commenting on the Vṛttikāra’s (p. 56,9–11) pratīmo hi vayam imam arthaṃ “vayam evānyedyur upalabhāmahe, vayam evādya smarāma” iti. tasmād vayam imam artham avagacchāmo “vayam eva hyo, vayam evādya” iti. ‘For we have cognitions with the following content: “It is we who experience something on one day, and it is the same we who remember it today”. Therefore we recognize the following fact: “It was we yesterday, and it is the same we today”.’
What we have here is a kind of recognition (pratyabhijñā) that brings together two I-cognitions, and realizes the identity of their two contents. That is why John Taber’s (1990) article on this view, referred to above, is titled ‘The Mīmāṃsā Theory of Self-Recognition’. The Vṛttikāra terms it pratyabhijñāpratyaya, ‘recognition cognition’ (p. 56,9), Kumārila pratyabhijñā, ‘recognition’ (ātmavāda 109, 115, 121, 124 and 136) and Jayanta sapratyabhijñāhampratyaya ‘I-cognition that includes a recognition’ (Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 269,11; Watson [forthcoming, §2.2]).
So what precisely is being put forward as the kind of cognition that perceives the self: a simple I-cognition, such as that which is verbalized as ‘I’ in ‘I see a pot’, or this more complex kind of self-recognition whose structure is ‘previously I perceived, and now this same I am perceiving’? In a way this is a false dichotomy, as for all three (the Vṛttikāra, Kumārila and Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsaka) both—simple I-cognitions and self-recognitions—perceive the self. But what is being put forward as the primary case of/evidence of self-perception? For the Vṛttikāra it is the self-recognition (see p. 56,7–9, cited in note 25). For Jayanta and Kumārila it is the simple I-cognition (ātmavāda 107cd: ahampratyayavijñeyaḥ svayam ātmopapādyate). The role of the self-recognition, for both of them, is to demonstrate that the content and agent of I-cognitions cannot be momentary cognitions (ātmavāda 115–125ab). So here too Jayanta is following Kumārila, not the Vṛttikāra.
See Ratié (2014, pp. 54–56).
Cf. Śābarabhāṣya (p. 56,7–9): na vayam “aham” itīmaṃ śabdaṃ prayujyamānam anyasminn arthe hetutvena vyapadiśāmaḥ, kiṃ tarhi śabdād vyatiriktaṃ pratyabhijñāpratyayam. ‘We are not pointing to the usage of the word “I” as a reason for [the existence] of something (i.e. the self) other than [cognition]; rather [we are pointing to] something different from the word—a certain kind of cognition, namely recognition [of the self].’
For a summary of View 1 see verses 228–240 of Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṅgraha and Kamalaśīla’s commentary; the Buddhist refutation is given in verses 263 and 275–284. For a study of all of those verses, see Ratié (2014, chapters 6 and 7). For an important contribution to the philosophical evaluation of View 1, see Oetke (1988, pp. 439–457 and 505–506).
Kumārila argues that cognition cannot be both perceiver and perceived in the śūnyavāda chapter of his Ślokavārttika (when commenting on Śābarabhāṣya pp. 28,14–30,17). In the first 63 verses of that chapter, Kumārila lays out the Vijñānavādin’s position (taking some arguments from the Buddhist pūrvapakṣa in the Śābarabhāṣya and some from Dignāga; see Watson and Kataoka [2010, pp. 294–296]; Taber [2010]), and he begins his refutation in the next verse (64) with:
naitad asti, tvayaikaṃ hi grāhyaṃ grāhakam iṣyate |
na caikasyaivamātmatve dṛṣṭāntaḥ kaścid asti te ||
‘That is not the case, for you are maintaining that one thing is both perceiver and perceived, yet you do not have any example illustrating such a [double, perceiver and perceived] nature in a single thing.’
We can thus see the central importance of Mīmāṃsā’s denial of any single thing being both perceiver and perceived for its refutation of Vijñānavāda (it is the central point of this programmatic verse, and many of the following 120 or so verses argue that cognition cannot be both). They thus have some explaining to do with regard to their view that the self can be both perceiver and perceived.
See Taber (1990, p. 56, note 35).
Śūnyavāda 67cd–68:
nanv ātmā grāhako grāhyo bhavatābhyupagamyate ||
kathaṃcid dharmarūpeṇa bhinnatvāt pratyayasya tat |
grāhakatvaṃ bhavet tatra, grāhyaṃ dravyādi cātmanaḥ ||
‘[Vijñānavādin:] Surely you hold that the self is both perceiver and perceived [which contradicts your argument that, because nothing can be both, cognition cannot be both].
[Mīmāṃsaka:] The fact of being a perceiver (tat grāhakatvam) with regard to the [self] (tatra) can belong to cognition (pratyayasya), because cognition, as a property (dharma), is to some extent different [from its locus]; what is perceived is the self’s [nature as] substance etc.’.
Sucaritamiśra comments: nirbhāgaṃ hi jñānam iti vaḥ siddhāntaḥ. na caivaṃvidhasya dvairūpaym upapannam. ātmā tu kenacid ātmanā grāhakaḥ, kenacid ātmanā grāhya iti kiṃ nopapadyate. tathā hi—asyārthasaṃyuktendriyasaṃyuktamanassaṃyoginaḥ pratyayo nāma dharmabhedo jāyate. sa cāsmāt kathañcid dharmarūpeṇa bhinnaḥ. tena cāyaṃ grāhakaḥ. yat tasya pṛthivyādidravyāntarasādhāraṇaṃ dravyādirūpaṃ tad grāhyam. jñānasya tu naivaṃvidhaḥ kaścid vibhāgo bauddhair iṣyate. ataḥ kathaṃ tasya dvairūpyam iti (Ślokavārttikakāśikā p. 126,15–21). ‘For your [Buddhist] siddhānta is that cognition is without parts. And it’s not possible that something of that kind could have a double nature. But as for the self, by contrast, it is the perceiver by means of a certain nature and the perceived by means of a certain [different] nature. So what is not possible [about that]? To explain further—the self’s (asya) so called cognition (pratyaya), which is a particular property (dharma), arises when the self is connected with the manas, which is in turn connected with a sense-faculty, which is in turn connected with an object. And that cognition is to some extent different from the [self], in as much as it is its property. And the self is a perceiver by means of that. As for what is perceived [by this cognition in cases of I-cognition], it is the self’s (tasya) nature as substance etc., which is something it shares with all other substances such as earth. But the Buddhists do not accept that cognition has any such division. So how could it have a double nature?’
Umbeka comments: tatrāpi dharmabhedena grāhyagrāhakayor vaiśeṣikābhimatena bhedo ’stīty āha “kathañcid” iti. bodharūpatayā tasya grāhakatvaṃ dravyarūpatayā tasya grāhyatvam ity arthaḥ (Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā p. 257,13–14). ‘Even in that case [of the self] there is a difference between perceiver and perceived in accordance with a difference of properties (dharma) [from each other and from the substrate to which they belong], as maintained by the Vaiśeṣikas. That is what [Kumārila] states in the verse beginning with kathañcid. Its meaning is that the self (tasya) is the perceiver insofar as it has cognition as its nature, and it is perceived insofar as it has substance as its nature.’
Pārthasārathimiśra comments: jñānasya jñeyān na kathañcid bhedo ’sti tava, mama tu svarūpeṇaiko ’py ātmā dharmarūpeṇa kathañcid bhinnaḥ. tad asya jñānarūpeṇa grāhakatvaṃ dravyādirūpeṇa grāhyatvam iti na grāhyagrāhakayor ekatvam iti (Nyāyaratnākara p. 206,6–8). ‘For you [Buddhists] there is no difference in any way at all between cognition and its object, but for us [Mīmāṃsakas] the self, despite being single in its own nature, is to some extent differentiated since it has properties as part of its nature. Thus [in I-cognition] it is the perceiver by means of its nature as cognition and it is the perceived by means of its nature as substance etc. Thus [we are] not [guilty of the fault of claiming] that one thing is both perceiver and perceived.’
Finally, Jayanta gives two glosses of Kumārila’s view, once in the sentence given in note 29, and once in the context of his refutation of Vijñānavāda: ātmapratyakṣavādināṃ tv avasthābhedena grāhyagrāhakāṃśayor bhedo vidyata eveti sarvathā na svaprakāśaṃ jñānam (Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 500,13–14 = Kataoka 2003, pp. 285, 1–2). ‘For the adherents of the view that a self is perceptible, on the other hand, there certainly exists a distinction between the part of it that is the perceiver and the part of it that is perceived, in accordance with the difference of its states. Therefore cognition is in no way self-illuminating.’
Thus Kumārila identifies the perceiver as the self’s cognition (pratyaya) and the perceived as its nature as substance etc. (dravyādi).* In other words the perceiver is a property of the self and the perceived is the locus of that property. Sucarita speaks of these as two different ‘natures’ (ātman) of the self, and Jayanta speaks of them as two different states (avasthā) or parts (aṃśa). Is Kumārila’s self still in some sense partless? According to Sucarita, no; it is partite. He contrasts the self, which has vibhāgas, with cognition that is nirbhāga. (And he too, like Jayanta, uses the word aṃśa in this context. See, in his commentary to verse 69ab, pratyayāṃśo grāhakaḥ, dravyāṃśo grāhyaḥ.)
We can see that Mīmāṃsakas, in the context of their arguments against Vijñānavādins to the effect that cognition cannot be perceiver and perceived because nothing can, had to justify their potentially embarrassing view that the self is both perceiver and perceived. The solution was to emphasize differentiation within the self and non-differentiation within cognition. (A Buddhist could of course reply either by denying the coherence of this division in a unitary and, according to many, partless self, or by affirming the division of cognition into a subject and object pole: grāhakāṃśa and grāhyāṃśa.)
* Neither Sucarita, Umbeka, Pārthasārathi nor Jayanta suggest any referents of the ‘etc.’ in ‘substance etc.’ and it is not obvious what Kumārila had in mind. Here are some—perhaps none entirely satisfactory—possibilities: the fact that the self is a substrate (āśrayatva), its all-pervasiveness (vibhutva), eternality (nityatva) or agency (kartṛtva).
yac cāvasthākṛtaṃ bhedam avalambya grāhyagrāhakabhāvasamarthanam ekasyaivātmanaḥ kṛtaṃ—kila dravyādirūpam ātmano grāhyaṃ jñātṛrūpaṃ ca grāhakam iti—tad anupapannam; dravyādirūpe grāhye, na jñātari, grāhyatā sādhitā syāt. ātmavartino ’pi dravyādirūpasya ghaṭāditulyatvāt (Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 270,9–12; Watson [forthcoming §2.3.1]). ‘As for the enabling of a relation of perceiver and perceived in a single self, attempted [by Kumārila] by resorting to a difference [within the self], resulting from [a difference of] states—namely “One might say that (kila) the self’s nature as substance and such like is the perceived, and its nature as agent of cognition* is the perceiver”—that is inadmissible. Only the perceived [part of the self, i.e. its] nature as substance and such like, but not [the part that is] the agent of cognition, would be established [ex hypothesi] to become an object of perception. For the nature as substance and such like, although it exists in the self, is comparable to/equivalent to a [mere] pot or other [object of perception].’
* Note that whereas Kumārila specifies the perceiver to be the self’s cognition (pratyaya), Jayanta names it as the self’s nature as cognizer (jñātṛrūpam). That is a striking and perhaps curious difference, but Jayanta may not be alone in taking Kumārila’s pratyaya in this kind of way: Umbeka’s jñātṛtā seems to correspond to Kumārila’s pratyaya. And when Sucarita writes tena [pratyayena] cāyaṃ grāhakaḥ (note 28), perhaps he too is seeing pratyaya—not only in I-cognition but more generally too—as that by means of which the self is a cognizer/perceiver. If so then for him too pratyaya seems to be equivalent to jñātṛtā.
tataś ca ghaṭādivat “idam”nirdeśyaḥ syād grāhyāṃśaḥ pṛthag eva, punar apy ātmano jñātur na grāhyatvam (Granthibhaṅga p. 182). ‘And thus the part [of the self] that is being perceived would be, like a pot, designated as “this”, something quite separate [from the perceiving part], while the perceiving part of the self would not itself be perceived.’
It is noteworthy that out of all the ways in which Jayanta could have objected to this view, he chooses this one. He could have appealed to his Naiyāyika view of the separateness of dharma and dharmin, which entails that this model of the self’s dharma perceiving its dharmin is not a case of (one aspect of) the self perceiving (another aspect of) the self, but rather cognition—which is characterized in Nyāya as part of the not-self (e.g. Nyāyabhāṣya p. 6,9–10)—perceiving the self. Or he could have disputed that cognition is capable of turning back and perceiving its own substrate. It may be that he chose this particular objection because it was a worry for the Mīmāṃsakas themselves: see note 38 for an articulation of this worry by a Mīmāṃsaka, though one who postdates Jayanta: Sucarita.
He glosses Kumārila’s pratyaya with jñātṛrūpa (obviously a close synonym of jñātṛtā), immediately before recounting Umbeka’s claims about jñātṛtā.
The passages of Umbeka cited in this note and notes 34 and 40 were not possible to understand from the edition alone, nor with the help of Jayanta’s paraphrase of them. I thank Kei Kataoka for sending me a scan of the relevant section of the invaluable S manuscript and his draft edition, based on this ms, of Umbeka’s commentary ad śūnyavāda 67cd–69. The abbreviations used in these notes are as follows:
S = Manuscript No. 29323, Sarasvatī Bhavan Library, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University. Devanāgarī. Paper. Incomplete. 206 folios.
Mā = readings given in footnotes of the edition and labeled as Mā. Perhaps this stands for mātṛkā and denotes the readings of the Adyar ms that the editors used.
bhavaty ātmasaṃbandhinī jñātṛtaiva grāhyā, jñātṛtaiva grāhikā. tathāpi grāhyagrāhakayor bhedaḥ, yasmād viṣayabhedena saiva bhidyate. na hi ghaṭagatajñātṛtayātmā paṭaṃ jānāti [ghaṭagatajñātṛtayātmā paṭaṃ jānāti conj; ghaṭajñātṛtayātmā paṭaṃ jānāti S; paṭagatajñātṛtāyām aghaṭaṃ jānāti ed.; paṭagatajñātayām āghaṭajñānāti Mā]. tatra yadā [yadā ed.; om. S] ghaṭādiviṣayā jñātṛtā grāhyā bhavati, tadātmaviṣayā [tadātmaviṣayā S; tatrātmaviṣayā ed.] grāhikā (Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā ad śūnyavāda 70, pp. 257, 1b–258, 6).
‘It is the cognizing power (jñātṛtā) connected with the self that becomes perceived [in I-cognition] and that very same cognizing power that is doing the perceiving [at that time]. Nevertheless there is a difference between the perceiver and the perceived, because that [cognizing power] is differentiated in accordance with its objects. For by means of a cognizing power that is engaged with a pot, the self does not know a cloth. In the [case of I-cognition], when a cognizing power that has a pot or such like as its object becomes perceived, the thing doing the perceiving is [a cognizing power] whose object is the self.’
Jayanta writes: yad api nipuṇaṃmanyair ucyate—bhavatu jñātṛtaiva grāhyā jñātṛtaiva grāhikā. tathāpi viṣayopādhikṛto ’sty eva bhedaḥ. ghaṭāvacchinnā hi jñātṛtā grāhyā, śuddhaiva tu jñātṛtā grāhiketi (Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, pp. 270,13–271,1; see Watson [forthcoming; §2.3.2] for the source of these readings—some words have dropped out in all of the editions and some manuscripts). ‘He who considers himself clever [i.e. Umbeka] has said the following: Let it be the [self’s] cognizing power (jñātṛtā) that is the perceived and the same cognizing power that is the perceiver. Nevertheless there is in fact a division [in it] owing to an object which is a secondary delimiting factor (upādhi). For the cognizing power when delimited by a pot is the perceived, but pure cognizing power is the perceiver.’
This passage continues in note 34 (where the yat is picked up).
“ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi” iti, etad uktaṃ bhavati—“ghaṭaṃ jānantam [ghaṭaṃ jānantam ed.; ghaṭajñātāram S] ātmānaṃ jānāmi” iti. athāpi kiṃ? tarhi tena [tarhi tena ed.; xx* tena S] yuktaṃ yad ātmakartṛkā [yad ātmakartṛkā conj.; yad x tmakartṛkā S; yady ātmakartṛkā ed; tad yad ātmakartṛkā Mā] saṃvittir vijñānasya [vijñānasya ed.; jñānasya S] kartari samupajāyate. etad uktaṃ bhavati—yuktaṃ yad [yad S; tad yad ed.] ātmakartṛkāyām saṃvittau saṃvedanakartur evātmanaḥ karmatvam, svayaṃprakāśatve vā karmatvābhāvaḥ [karmatvābhāvaḥ S; karmatvābhāve ed.], asmatprayogasaṃbhinnatvāt saṃvitteḥ “ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi” ity asmadarthapratibhāsanād ity arthaḥ (Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā ad śūnyavāda 70, p. 258,6–11).
* x = one illegible akṣara.
‘By “I perceive a pot” is meant “I perceive myself perceiving a pot”. And if [someone asks:] “So what?”, [we reply:] So because of that, it becomes quite fitting that [as Kumārila has said] cognition, having the self as its agent, arises with regard to the agent of the cognition. This is what is taught. It is appropriate that in that cognition, whose agent is the self, the object (karma) is that very agent of the cognition, i.e. the self, or [the self] is not the object, since we have a case of self-luminosity, for in “I perceive a pot” there is a shining forth of the referent of “I” (i.e. the self), since the cognition is linked with the use of “I”. That is the meaning [of Kumārila’s verse].’
Jayanta writes: “ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi” iti ko ’rthaḥ? “ghaṭam jānantam ātmānaṃ jānāmi” iti. asmatprayogasaṃbhedāc caivam avakalpate. anyatra tu śuddhaviṣayagrahaṇam eva bhavati “ghaṭo ’yam” iti. tad etad saralamatipratāraṇamātram (Nyāyamañjarī Vol.2, p. 271,1–4; Watson [forthcoming, §2.3.2]).
‘What is the meaning of “I perceive a pot”? “I perceive the self perceiving a pot.” And it is because of connection with the use of the first person (asmatprayogasaṃbhedāt)* that it works (avakalpate) in this way [i.e. includes a perception of the self]. Otherwise it would be the pure grasping of an object in the form, “this is a pot”. This [view of Umbeka’s] serves merely to deceive the simple-minded.’
* Cakradhara comments on asmatprayogasaṃbhedāc ca: tad uktam—
asmatprayogasaṃbhinnā jñānasyaiva ca kartari |
bhavantī tatra saṃvittir yujyetāpy ātmakartṛkā || iti (Ślokavārttika, śūnyavāda 70). asmado yaḥ prayogo ’ham iti tena saṃbhinnā tadanupraveśavatī (Granthibhaṅga p. 182). ‘Thus [Kumārila] has said: “In that case cognition (saṃvittiḥ), which has the self as its agent, occurring with regard to the agent of the cognition itself, is also possible, [since] it is connected with the usage ‘I’.” The meaning of asmatprayogasaṃbhinnā is: connected with, i.e. entered by, the use of the first person, i.e. “I”.’
Shah (1972, p. 182, note 5) has been misled by the corrupt state of the Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā edition. Following that edition, he gives this form of Umbeka’s text: na hi paṭagatajñātṛtāyām aghaṭaṃ jānāti; tatra yadā ghaṭādiviṣayā jñātatā grāhyā bhavati, tatrātmaviṣayā grāhikā “ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi” iti. (1) It is not clear how na hi paṭagatajñātṛtāyām aghaṭaṃ jānāti could yield coherent sense. (2) We want jñātṛtā (as in fact the Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā edition reads), not jñātatā. (3) There is certainly a sentence break after grāhikā, with “ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi” iti beginning the new sentence given at the beginning of this note. (4) A smaller point: the double tatra is awkward; in place of the second one the manuscript’s tadā (correlating with yadā) is clearly smoother.
Sinha (1934, p. 227), summarizing this part of the Nyāyamañjarī, was not aware of the Umbeka source passages given in this note and note 33; he took all of Jayanta’s Views 1, 2 and 3 to be those of Kumārila. View 3 is attributed to Umbeka by Cakradhara in the Granthibhaṅga (p. 182,15). The latter was not published when Sinha wrote his book.
atyantabhedas tu ghaṭatajjñānayor apy [apy S; om. ed.] asmābhir naiveṣṭah (Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā ad śūnyavāda 69ab, p. 257,16).
atyantabhedo hi ghaṭāgnyādīnām apy asmābhir neṣyata eva, dravyādirūpeṇābhedāt (Ślokavārttikakāśikā ad śūnyavāda 69ab, p. 126,3b–2b).
na kvacid apy atyantabhedo ’sty, sarvatra prameyatvādyabhedāt (Nyāyaratnākara ad śūnyavāda 69ab, p. 206,11).
nanv evaṃ paragocara evāhampratyayo bhavet, param hi pratyayātmano dravyādirūpam (Ślokavārttikakāśikā ad śūnyavāda 69ab, p. 127,3–4).
na hi jñānamātraṃ grāhakam, kintu tadviśiṣṭo dharmī. sa evāhambuddhyā dravyādirūpeṇa gṛhyate, na dravyādimātram. tenopādhibhede ’py upahitasya kartuḥ karmaṇaś ca pratyāsatter ekatvāt, yuktaṃ pratyagātmavṛttitvam (Nyāyaratnākara ad śūnyavāda 69cd, p. 206,16–19).
‘For the perceiver is not mere cognition, but the property possessor [i.e. the self] that is qualified by that [cognition]. And it is that very same thing [i.e. the property possessor] that is grasped in its nature as substance etc. through I-cognition—it is not the mere substance etc. [that is grasped]. Therefore even though there is a difference of secondary delimiting factors (upādhi), there is oneness of the agent—which has one upādhi—, and the object—which has another upādhi*—, by means of their extreme proximity [to the self and hence to each other]. And therefore it is appropriate [of the Vṛttikāra to speak of the I-cognition] as operating with regard to the inner self [which implies that the latter is both its object and its agent].’
* I take it that upahitasya means ‘having an upādhi’, and goes with both kartuḥ and karmanaḥ. The upādhi in the case of the agent (i.e. the self) is the fact that it is jñānaviśiṣṭa, the upādhi in the case of the object (i.e. the self) is the fact that it is dravyādirūpa.
pratyāsattilakṣaṇena tu [tu S; om. ed.] sambandhenātmasambandhinī [sambandhinī conj.; sambandhinā S; sambandhino ed.] bodharūpatātmasambandhinyām [rūpatātmasambandhinyām conj.; rūpatātmasaṃbaṃdhadhinyām S; rūpasyātma-sambandhinyām ed.] eva dravyarūpatāyāṃ pravartate [pravartate S; pravartitā ed.]. […] kadācid ātmasambandhinī bodharūpatā ghaṭādidravyaviṣayā [bodharūpatā ghaṭādidravyaviṣayā S; bodharūpatāsya viṣayaḥ ed.]. tatra ghaṭādayo bodhyāḥ. kadācit tu [tu S; om. ed.] pratyāsattilakṣaṇena sambandhenātmagatadravyarūpatāviṣayā [viṣayā S; viṣayaḥ ed.]. tadātmāivātmano bodhya ity ucyate (Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā ad śūnyavāda 69, p. 257,16–20).
‘Now the cognition nature—which is connected with the self by a relation of extreme proximity—operates towards the substance nature—which is also connected to the self [by a relation of extreme proximity]. […] Sometimes the cognition nature connected with the self has as its object a substance such as a pot. In that case the pot or such like is what is perceived. But at other times [the cognition nature] has as its object the substance nature that is in the self by a relation of extreme proximity. At those times it is nothing other than the self that is taught to be perceived by the self.’
In view of what has been said above, we will expect that even those views which respond maximally to the second worry and minimally to the first, i.e. those that aim for maximum closeness and minimum distance, will always stop short of complete identity. The bottom line, surely, is that complete identity of perceiver and perceived must be avoided at all costs, for if that possibility is granted, then Mīmāṃsaka arguments against the Vijñānavādin Buddhist—to the effect that cognition cannot be perceiver and perceived because no one thing can be both—will be undermined. Indeed even though Pārthasārathi does actually use the word ekatva, ‘oneness’ (note 39), to describe the relationship between perceiver and perceived in I-cognition, he qualifies this as ‘oneness due to extreme proximity’, and immediately says: bhedaś ca kiyān apy asti na sarvātmanaikatvam iti, ‘and [even on this view of oneness due to extreme proximity] there is a slight difference, not complete oneness’. Similarly we find Umbeka asserting difference both after formulating (in note 40) Kumārila’s position (View 2) in a way that stresses the extreme proximity of perceiver and perceived (tatrāpi na grāhyagrāhakayor aikyam, ad śūnyavāda 69cd), and when giving his own new view (View 3) (see tathāpi grāhyagrāhakayor bhedaḥ, yasmād viṣayabhedena saiva bhidyate in note 33). But we have to mention here one exception to this ‘bottom line’. Pārthasārathi sees Kumārila’s śūnyavāda verses 68 and 69 as teaching a kind of self-perception in which there is difference between perceiver and perceived, but verse 70 as teaching a kind in which there is complete identity. He introduces that verse with the words yady api sarvātmanaikyaṃ* tathāpi na doṣa ity āha …
* The 1978 Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī edition, which is the most commonly used Ślokavārttika edition, including by many scholars of Mīmāṃsā, prints sarvātmanaikya; the 1898–99 Chowkhamba ed. of Rama Sastri Tailanga includes the anusvāra, which of course we need. This is a common pattern. Here are three other examples of Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī omitting an anusvāra that we need and that is there in Tailanga’s edition: karmatva (p. 205,8) needs to be corrected to karmatvaṃ; ātmāna (p. 205,10) needs to be corrected to ātmānaṃ; karmatva (p. 206,3) needs to be corrected to karmatvaṃ. For remarks on the different Ślokavārttika editions, see Kataoka (2011a, b, Part 1: vi–vii, xxiv–xxxvii).
na hy ātmānyajanyena jñānena ghaṭādir iva prakāśyate, api tu svata eva prakāśate (Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 273,3–4; Watson [forthcoming, §2.4]). ‘For the self is not illuminated—in the way that a pot or such like is illuminated by a cognition produced in something other than itself—rather it shines forth of itself.’
tad idam ātmaprakāśanaṃ saṃvidvad avagantavyam. yad āhuḥ, “saṃvit saṃvittayaiva saṃvedyā, na saṃvedyatayā” iti, nāsyāḥ karmabhāvo vidyata ity arthaḥ. evam ātmā grāhakatayaiva prakāśate, na grāhyatayā (Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 273,8–11; Watson [forthcoming, §2.4]).
‘So the shining forth of the self should be understood to be just like [the shining forth of] consciousness. As [Prabhākara] says, “Consciousness is experienced as consciousness, not as an object of consciousness”, the meaning being that consciousness is never found to be an object (karma). In the same way the self shines forth only as the perceiver, not as the perceived.’
See Bṛhatī p. 64,2–3: na brūmo na saṃvedyā saṃvid iti. saṃvittayaiva hi saṃvit saṃvedyā, na saṃvedyatayā; and p. 64,5: nāsyāḥ karmabhāvo vidyata ity arthaḥ.
athocyate—na pratyakṣa ātmā, kin tv aparokṣa iti. nedam arthāntaravacanam. śiśava evaṃ pratāryante, na prāmāṇikāḥ. pratyakṣaś ca na bhavati, aparokṣaś ca bhavatīti citram. pratyakṣajñānakarmatvam asya nāstīti cet, tarhy aparokṣatvam api mā bhūt. prakāśatvād aparokṣatvam iti cet, na… (Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 274,1–5; Watson [forthcoming: §2.5.2]). ‘If you say, the self is not perceived (na pratyakṣa), but it is not beyond our awareness (aparokṣa), this is not a phrase with any different meaning (i.e. to say that something is perceived is to say that it is ‘not beyond our awareness’). Children are thus fooled, not logicians—it is both not perceived and not beyond our awareness—that is wonderful! If you say [the sense in which it is ‘not perceived’ is that] it is not the object of direct perception, then it should also not be ‘not beyond our awareness’. If you say it is not beyond our awareness because it is an illuminator, that is not correct …’.
While aparokṣa is usually used in Sanskrit as a synonym of pratyakṣa (in the sense of ‘perceptible’), Śālikanātha is an example of a Prābhākara author who differentiates them. He maintaines that being perceptible (pratyakṣa) includes being cognized by cognition involving one of the six sense-faculties, whereas being aparokṣa means being accessible to awareness without any involvement of these six sense-faculties. See Ṛjuvimalā p. 64,9b–8b: pratyakṣaśabdo ’pi saṃvidām aparokṣatayā, na punar indriyajñānavedyatayaiveti mantavyam. ‘And it should be known that the word “perceptible” (pratyakṣa), when used of instances of consciousness, means aparokṣa; it does not mean “cognizable by sense-cognition”.’
Whereas Śālikanātha applies this special sense of aparokṣa to consciousness (saṃvit), Jayanta’s Prābhākara applies it to the self. Similarly, we saw above that Jayanta’s Prābhākara claims that the self is perceived as the perceiver, not as an object, whereas the Prabhākara citation given by Jayanta claims that consciousness is perceived as consciousness, not as an object of consciousness. What is not yet clear to me is whether Jayanta’s claims about the self in his presentation of View 4 are the result of extending what the Prābhākaras say of consciousness to the self, or whether these claims about the self had already been made by Prabhākara / other Prābhākaras known to Jayanta.
As evidence that Śālikanātha saw the Prābhākara position as a way of avoiding the incongruity of a single thing being both perceiver and perceived, both agent and object of the same cognition, see Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 333, 1–3: tatra ke cid āhuḥ—mānasaṃ pratyakṣaṃ sukhādiṣv ivātmani pramāṇamiti. tad ayuktam iti prābhākarāḥ. na hy ekasya kartṛtvam karmatvaṃ ca svāpekṣam upapadyate, svātmani kriyāvṛttivirodhāt. ‘In response to that [question], some maintain that the means of knowing the self is mental perception, as it is [the means of knowing] pleasure and such like. The Prābhākaras hold that that is incorrect. For it is not possible that one thing can be both agent and object with regard to itself, for it is contradictory [to suppose that] an instance of activity [could act] towards itself.’
Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 273,9; Watson (forthcoming, §2.4); Bṛhatī p. 64,2–3.
Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 273,10; Watson (forthcoming, §2.4); Bṛhatī p. 64,5.
“ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi” ity atra trayapratibhāsaḥ— “ghaṭam” iti viṣayaḥ prakāśate, “aham” ity ātmā, “jānāmi” iti saṃvit (Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 274,15–16; Watson [forthcoming; §2.5.4]).
‘In [the cognition] “I am perceiving a pot”, three things appear: the object shines forth, denoted by “pot”, the self, denoted by “I”, and consciousness, denoted by “am perceiving”.’
kalpanādvaiguṇyaṃ ca bhavatām, ātmā ca svaprakāśaḥ, saṃvic ca svaprakāśeti. na ca nipuṇamatir api vivekam īdṛśam upadarśayituṃ śaknoti bhavān—iyaṃ svaprakāśā phalarūpā saṃvit, ayaṃ svaprakāśo jñātṛrūpa ātmeti. citraṃ cedaṃ yat tayor dvayoḥ prakāśayor antarāle tadvyāpāraḥ parokṣo jñānākhyaḥ sampanna iti (Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 274,10–14; Watson [forthcoming; §2.5.3]).
‘And you double-postulate—both a self-illuminating self and self-illuminating consciousness. And you cannot demonstrate the following kind of discernment even though you are sharp-minded: this is consciousness which is self-illuminating and has the form of the fruit; this is the self which is self-illuminating and has the form of the knower. And as for your claim that between those two things which are shining forth their action, namely cognition, arises as something imperceptible—that is wonderful!’
I note that there is one contemporary scholar who spotted Jayanta’s reliance on Prabhākara in this passage. I have a scan of Frauwallner’s copy of the Vizianagaram edition of the Nyāyamañjarī, and next to the words saṃvit saṃvittayaiva saṃvedyā, na vedyatayā, in the margin of p. 432, is written in his handwriting: ‘Bṛhatī 82,7’.
References
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I would like to thank three people in particular: Harunaga Isaacson, with whom I read, in 1998/9, the part of the Nyāyāmañjarī on which this article is based; Kei Kataoka, who has helped me in many more ways with this article than are indicated in the individual footnotes that mention his name; and John Taber, whose seminal article ‘The Mīmāṃsā Theory of Self-Recognition’ is the current high watermark for the investigation of ‘View 1’, and whose work in general serves as a fine model for how to do the History of Indian Philosophy.
Appendix: The Proponent of View 4
Appendix: The Proponent of View 4
Jayanta’s View 4 has been mentioned in some secondary literature, but has not, I think, been correctly identified there. Sinha (1934, pp. 228–230) and Sasaki (1996) regard it as the view of Śaṅkara. Taber (1990, p. 53) regards it as either a ‘Kashmīri Śaiva’ or an Advaita Vedāntin view. Here are the pieces of evidence weighing in favour of Jayanta having intended it as the view of Prabhākara.
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Jayanta’s articulation of the position includes two quotations from Prabhākara’s Bṛhatī: saṃvit saṃvittayaiva saṃvedyā, na saṃvedyatayāFootnote 46 and nāsyāḥ karmabhāvo vidyata ity arthaḥ.Footnote 47
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Cakradhara, who may have lived in the 11th century,Footnote 48 seems to take the position to be that of the Prābhākaras. When commenting on Jayanta’s ātmā grāhakatayaiva prakāśyate, na grāhyatayā (‘The self is illuminated as the perceiver, not as the perceived’), he writes:
ekasyāṃ saṃvidy anubhavārūḍhasya trayasya svena svena rūpeṇāvabhāsanāt pramātuḥ prameyasya pramiteś ca. pramātātmā pramātṛtayaiva bhāsate, anyathā bhāsane ’sya prameyād aviśeṣaḥ syāt. evaṃ pramitir api svarūpeṇaiva bhasate, na pramātṛprameyarūpatayā, prameyaṃ tu prameyarūpatayaiva. ata eva tritayapratibhāso ’bhyupagato bhavati, anyathā sarvaṃ prameyam eva syāt (Granthibhaṅga, p. 183).
‘Because in a single cognition three things, having “mounted” the experience, appear each in their own form: the agent of the cognition, the object of cognition and the cognition itself. The self—the agent—appears as the agent; if it appeared in another way it would not be different from the object of the cognition. Likewise the cognition too appears in its own form, neither in the form of the agent nor the object; and as for the object, that appears in the form of the object. For that reason we accept the appearance of three different things. Otherwise everything would be just the object of knowledge.’
Cakradhara elaborates Jayanta’s claim that the self appears to us as the perceiver in terms of the tritayapratibhāsa theory: a well-known Prābhākara view.Footnote 49 He is thus surely taking Jayanta to be putting forward a Prābhākara position.
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When Jayanta turns to criticizing the view, he himself attributes to the proponents of View 4 the same claim—terming it trayapratibhāsa—that in each cognition three things appear: the agent of the cognition, i.e. the self, the object of the cognition, and consciousness (saṃvit), the result of the cognition.Footnote 50 (That is probably the reason for Cakradhara’s earlier exegesis in terms of this theory.)
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When Jayanta criticizes the view, he makes fun of its proponents for being subtle-minded enough to distinguish between a self-luminous self, the agent of cognition, and self-luminous saṃvit (consciousness), the result (phala) of cognition. Quite why, he continues, they maintain that between these two self-appearances cognition itself (jñāna) remains imperceptible, is utterly mysterious.Footnote 51 The distinction between saṃvit and jñāna, the identification of the former as the result (phala) of cognition, and the contention that jñāna, unlike saṃvit, is imperceptible, are all hallmarks of the Prābhākara view; none of them were maintained by either the Śaivas or the Vedāntins.
There is, incidentally, so far no conclusive evidence that Jayanta knew Śaṅkara, nor any other place in the Nyāyamañjarī where he deals with non-dualistic Śaivism (he is slightly too early to be taking account of that form of Śaivism). But there is plenty of evidence from other parts of the Nyāyamañjarī that he knew Prabhākara.Footnote 52
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Watson, A. Four Mīmāṃsā Views Concerning the Self’s Perception of Itself. J Indian Philos 48, 889–914 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09446-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09446-x