Abstract
An absence and its locus are the same ontological entity. But the cognition of the absence is different from the cognition of the locus. The cognitive difference is caused by a query followed by a cognitive process of introspection. The moment one perceptually knows y that contains only one thing, z, one is in a position to conclude that y contains the absence of any non-z. After having a query as to whether y has x one revisits one’s knowledge of y containing z and comes to know that x is absent from y. Thus the knowledge of the absence of x logically follows from the knowledge of y containing z through the mediation of a query. This analysis goes against the thesis according to which an absence is an irreducible entity that is to be known through senses, and is inspired by the Mīmāṃsā views, especially the Prābhākara views, on absence and its cognition.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Buchdahl, G. (1961). The problem of negation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 22(2), 163–178.
Dasgupta, S. N. (1922). A history of Indian philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Demos, R. (1917). A discussion of a certain type of negative proposition. Mind, 26(102), 188–196.
Dravida, L. S. (1916). Sastradipika of Parthasarathi Mishra. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series: Benares.
Gale, R. M. (1972). On What There isn’t. The Review of Metaphysics, 25(3), 459–488.
Gillon, B. S. (2001). Negative facts and knowledge of negative facts. In R. W. Perrett (Ed.), Indian philosophy: A collection of readings (metaphysics). New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.
Heinemann, F. H. (1943–1944). The meaning of negation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 44, 127–152.
Jha, D. (1971). Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika of Kumārilabhaṭṭa. Darbhanga: Kameswar Simha Darbhanga Sanskrit University.
Jha, G. (1978). The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. Motilal Banarasidas: Delhi.
Kar, G. (2003). Śabdārtha-sambandha-samīkṣā. Kolkata: Sanskrit Book Depot.
Matilal, B. K. (1968). The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McGrath, S. (2005). Causation by omission: A dilemma. Philosophical Studies, 123, 125–148.
Mohanty, J. N. (1966). Gangeśa’s theory of truth. Santiniketan: Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy.
Perszyk, K. J. (1984). Negative entities and negative facts in Navya-Nyāya. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 12(3), 265–275.
Rosenberg, J. F. (1972). Russell on negative facts. Noûs, 6(1), 27–40.
Russell, B. (2010). The philosophy of logical atomism. London: Routledge Classics.
Sartre, J. P. (1956). Being and nothingness: An essay on phenomenological ontology (H. E. Barnes, Trans.). Philosophical Library: New York.
Sastri, A. C. (1929). Bṛhatī of Prabhakara Misra with the Ṛjuvimala of Mahamahopadhyaya Salikanatha Misra. Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.
Śāstrī, P. B. (1968). Bhāṣāpariccheda of Viśvanātha with Muktāvalī commentary of Viśvanātha and Muktāvalī-saṃgraha subcommentary of Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya Śāstrī. Kontai: Satinath Bhattacharya.
Sharma, D. (1966). Epistemological negative dialectics of Indian logic: Abhāva versus Anupalabdhi. Indo-Iranian Journal, 9(4), 291–300.
Shastry, C. S. R. (1923). Karikavali with Muktavali, Prabha, Manjusha, Dinakariya, Ramarudriya & Gangaram Jatiya. Mylapore: Sri Balamanorama Press.
Tarkavagish, K. (1990). Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gansesa Upadhyāya (Vol. I). Chaukhamba: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan.
Wallace, W. (2009). Hegel’s logic (Part one of the Encyclopaedia of The Philosophical Sciences (1830)) (G. W. F. Hegel, Trans.). Pacifica, CA: Marxists Internet Archive.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Guha, N. No Black Scorpion is Falling: An Onto-Epistemic Analysis of Absence. J Indian Philos 41, 111–131 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-013-9175-6
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-013-9175-6