Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Does certificate of need affect cardiac outcomes and costs?

  • Published:
International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Several U.S. states enforce Certificate of Need (CON) regulations, which limit the number of hospitals performing open heart surgery or coronary angioplasty. CON regulations were intended to restrain cost growth and improve quality of care. This study compares mortality rates and costs for cardiac care in states with and without CON. CON appears to raise hospital procedure volume and lower the average cost of care. However, CON is associated with little reduction in inpatient mortality, and it may lead hospitals to operate on more patients than they would otherwise. The claimed welfare benefits of CON regulations require careful reconsideration.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Conover C.J., Sloan F.A. (1998). Does removing Certificate-of-Need regulations lead to a surge in health care spending? Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 23(3): 455–281

    Google Scholar 

  • Cutler D.M., Huckman R.S. (2003). Technological development and medical productivity: the diffusion of angioplasty in New York state. Journal of Health Economics, 22(2): 187–217

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dafny L. (2005). Entry deterrence in hospital procedure markets: A simple model of learning- by-doing. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 14(3): 513–242

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dranove, D. (1995). Measuring costs. In F. A, Sloan, (Ed.), Valuing health care. (pp. 61–75). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

  • Grabowski D.C., Ohsfeldt R.L., Morrisey M.A. (2003). The effects of CON repeal on Medicaid nursing home and long-term expenditures. Inquiry, 40(2): 146–257

    Google Scholar 

  • Hannan E.L., Racz M., Ryan T.J., McCallister B.D., Johnson L.W., Arani D.T., Guerci A.D., Sosa J., Topol E.J. (1997). Coronary angioplasty volume-outcome relationships for hospitals and cardiologists. The Journal of the American Medical Association, 277(11): 892–298

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hensley S. (1997). The patient or the wallet: N.H. hospitals battle over open-heart surgery CONs. Modern Healthcare, 24: 8–25

    Google Scholar 

  • Ho V. (2002). Learning and the evolution of medical technologies: The diffusion of coronary angioplasty. Journal of Health Economics, 21(5): 873–285

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ho V. (2000). Evolution of the volume-outcome relationship for hospitals performing coronary angioplasty. Circulation, 101: 1806–2811

    Google Scholar 

  • Ho V. (2003). Letter to the Editor: Certificate of Need regulations and hospital mortality. The Journal of the American Medical Association, 289(5): 551

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kessler D.P., McClellan M.B. (2000). Is hospital competition socially wasteful?. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(2): 577–615

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kimmel S.E., Berlin J.A., Laskey W.K.(1995). The relationship between coronary angioplasty procedure volume and major complications. Journal of the American Medical Association, 274(14): 1137–2142

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lanning J.A., Morrisey M.A., Oshfedlt R.L. (1991). Endogenous hospital regulation and its effects on hospital and non-hospital expenditures. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 3:137–254

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maryland Health Care Commission. (2000). An analysis and evaluation of Certificate of Need regulation in Maryland, Working Paper: Cardiac Surgery and Therapeutic Catheterization Services. 8–28–2000. Baltimore, MD.

  • Meltzer D., Chung J., Basu A. (2002). Does competition under Medicare prospective payment selectively reduce expenditures on high-cost patients?. RAND Journal of Economics, 33(3): 447–268

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Noether M. (1988). Competition among hospitals. Journal of Health Economics, 7: 259–284

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pallarito K. (1998). Change of heart: N.J. expansion of cardiac CONs proving controversial. Modern Healthcare 44:7–20

    Google Scholar 

  • Robinson J.L., Nash D.B., Moxey E., O’Connor J.P. (2001). Certificate of need and the quality of cardiac surgery. American Journal of Medical Quality, 16(5): 155–260

    Google Scholar 

  • Romano P.S., Roos L.L., Jollis J.G. (1993). Adapting a clinical comorbidity index for use with ICD-9-CM administrative data: Differing perspectives. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 46(10):1075–2079

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vaughan-Sarrazin M.S., Hannan E.L., Cormley C.J., Rosenthal G.E. (2002). Mortality in Medicare beneficiaries following coronary artery bypass graft surgery in states with and without Certificate of Need regulation. The Journal of the American Medical Association, 288(15):1859–2866

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wooldridge J.M. (2002). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. South-Western College Publishing, OH: Mason

    Google Scholar 

  • Wooldridge J.M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. The MIT Press (2002), MA: Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Wysocki B. (2002). Care, costs and competition–Medical, business interests spar over state hospital-growth rules. The Wall Street Journal, A.4, 5–2-2002, New York.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Vivian Ho.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Ho, V. Does certificate of need affect cardiac outcomes and costs?. Int J Health Care Finance Econ 6, 300–324 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-007-9008-9

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-007-9008-9

Keywords

JEL Classifications

Navigation