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The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution: Reflections on Three Decades of Development

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Abstract

The fundamental design and inherent capabilities of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) to address a rich range of complex real world conflict situations are put into perspective by tracing its historical development over a period spanning more than 30 years, and highlighting great opportunities for meaningful future expansions within an era of artificial intelligence (AI) and intensifying conflict in an over-crowded world. By constructing a sound theoretical foundation for GMCR based upon assumptions reflecting what actually occurs in reality, a fascinating story is narrated on how GMCR was able to expand in bold new directions as well as take advantage of many important legacy decision technologies built within the earlier Metagame Analysis and later Conflict Analysis paradigms. From its predecessors, for instance, GMCR could benefit by the employment of option form put forward within Metagame Analysis for effectively recording a conflict, as well as preference elicitation techniques and solution concepts for defining chess-like behavior when calculating stability of states from the realm of Conflict Analysis. The key ideas outlined in the paper underlying the current and projected capabilities of GMCR include the development of four different ways to handle preference uncertainty in the presence of either transitive or intransitive preferences; a wide range of solution concepts for describing many kinds of human behavior under conflict; unique coalition analysis algorithms for determining if a given decision maker can fare better in a dispute via cooperation; tracing the evolution of a conflict over time; and the matrix formulation of GMCR for computational efficiency when calculating stability and also theoretically expanding GMCR in bold new directions. Inverse engineering is mentioned as an AI extension of GMCR for computationally determining the preferences required by decision makers in order to reach a desirable state, such as a climate change agreement in which all nations significantly cut back on their greenhouse gas emissions. The basic design of a decision support system for permitting researchers and practitioners to readily apply the foregoing and other advancements in GMCR to tough real world controversies is discussed. Although GMCR has been successfully applied to challenging disputes arising in many different fields, a simple climate change negotiation conflict between the US and China is utilized to explain clearly key concepts mentioned throughout the fascinating historical journey surrounding GMCR.

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Acknowledgements

The authors feel highly privileged to have worked with many talented graduate students and colleagues from Canada and around the globe on research topics connected to the theory and practice of GMCR. Many of the papers cited in this article were written jointly with other researchers while other referenced work did not involve the authors. The academic home at which they completed much of their GMCR research is the Conflict Analysis Group located in the Department of Systems Design Engineering at the University of Waterloo. The authors would like to express their sincere appreciation to Dr. Yi Xiao, a Postdoctoral Fellow within the Conflict Analysis Group and its Executive Manager (2017 to 2019), for his timely advice and work in preparing the current paper. Ms. Yu (Jasmine) Han, an International Visiting Graduate Student within the Conflict Analysis Group (November 2018 to November 2019) who is from the Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics in China where she is a Ph.D. student, kindly assisted the authors to incorporate reviewers’ comments into this paper. They are also grateful to Mrs. Sheila Hipel for carefully reading many versions of the paper to enhance its presentation quality. They are thankful to a number of professional organizations for sponsoring academic journals and conferences in which papers dealing with GMCR were published and presented over many years. These include the Group Decision and Negotiation Section of INFORMS (The Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences) which is affiliated with the Springer journal Group Decision and Negotiation and hosts an annual international conference, as well as the IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics Society which publishes the journal named the IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics: Systems and holds a yearly international conference. The authors have organized special sessions on conflict resolution at all international GDN and SMC conferences since 2001 and 1991, respectively. Special sessions on conflict resolution have been included in all conferences sponsored by the International Conferences on Water Resources and Environment Research (ICWRER) since the founding of this sequence of conferences at Waterloo in 1993. The research appearing in this paper and other published work involving the authors were funded by Discovery Grants separately held by the authors from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada (Grant Nos. RGPIN-2018-04345, RGPIN-2017-04379). Finally, the authors would like to express their gratitude to anonymous referees whose suggestions improved the quality of their paper.

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Hipel, K.W., Fang, L. & Kilgour, D.M. The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution: Reflections on Three Decades of Development. Group Decis Negot 29, 11–60 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09648-z

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