Abstract
Committee selection with diversity or distributional constraints is a ubiquitous problem. However, many of the formal approaches proposed so far have certain drawbacks including (1) computational intractability in general, and (2) inability to suggest a solution for instances where the hard constraints cannot be met. We propose a cubic-time algorithm for diverse committee selection that satisfies natural axioms and draws on the idea of using soft bounds.
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Notes
The model where synergies or presence of diverse agents provide additional points to the committee has been considered in a general model by Izsak et al. (2018).
More general models also allow for expressing upper quotas. The goal of the upper quotas can easily be met by setting lower quotas on the complement of the set of types.
Note that \(\underline{q^t}\) is not a vector. The underscore denotes that it is a lower bound.
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Aziz, H. A Rule for Committee Selection with Soft Diversity Constraints. Group Decis Negot 28, 1193–1200 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09634-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09634-5
Keywords
- Social choice theory
- Committee voting
- Multi-winner voting
- Diversity constraints
- Computational complexity