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Symmetric Sequential Stability in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution with Multiple Decision Makers

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Abstract

In this work, we generalize a solution concept, called symmetric sequential stability (SSEQ), in the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) for conflicts involving n decision makers. We present new relations of this concept with existing stability definitions in the GMCR, namely: Nash stability, general metarational stability, symmetric metarational stability, sequential stability, limited-move stability of horizon 3 and credible metarational stable states of 2 rounds. We also present the SSEQ stability definition for a coalition and its relationship with existing solution concepts in that case. Finally, SSEQ stability is extended for GMCR with uncertain, probabilistic and fuzzy preferences.

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Acknowledgements

The first author would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPQ) and of the Fundação de Amparo à Ciência e Tecnologia do Estado de Pernambuco (FACEPE). The second author would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES).

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Correspondence to Leandro Chaves Rêgo.

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Rêgo, L.C., Vieira, G.I.A. Symmetric Sequential Stability in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution with Multiple Decision Makers. Group Decis Negot 26, 775–792 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-016-9520-8

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