Abstract
Resource reallocation problems aim to determine an allocation maximizing a given objective function. Numerous applications are based on the assumption of restricted contacts between entities but, up to now, studies have been based on unrealistic contexts. Indeed, most of the time, agents are omniscient and/or have complete communication abilities, which are not plausible assumptions in many applications. A solution does not only consist in an optimal allocation, but in a sequence of transactions changing an initial allocation into an optimal solution. We show that the individual rationality does not allow the achievement of socially optimal allocations, and we propose a more suitable criterion: the sociability. Our method provides a sequence of transactions leading to an optimal allocation, with any restriction on agents’ communication abilities. Provided solutions can be viewed as emergent phenomena.
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Nongaillard, A., Mathieu, P. Agent-Based Reallocation Problem on Social Networks. Group Decis Negot 23, 1067–1083 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9336-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9336-0