Abstract
A spatial model of coalition formation is used together with data from Dutch elections and theoretical instances to study different procedures of coalition formation. The model shows that procedure plays an important role in reaching a coalition agreement and that political parties do not necessarily benefit from being a first-mover. Moreover, it is shown that a decrease in a party’s flexibility can be (dis)advantageous in coalition negotiations. Furthermore, certain power sharing tactics appear not always to lead to an agreement that is in a party’s advantage. The main message put forward is that the procedure of forming a coalition plays a more important role than is usually acknowledged in literature and practice.
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We like to thank the anonymous referees and editor for their useful comments that helped to improve the paper. The Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation is acknowledged for project TIN2008-01117. Eligius M.T. Hendrix is a fellow of the Spanish “Ramon y Cajal” contract program, co-financed by the European Social Fund.
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Hendrix, E.M.T., de Ridder, A., Rusinowska, A. et al. Coalition Formation: The Role of Procedure and Policy Flexibility. Group Decis Negot 22, 407–427 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-011-9276-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-011-9276-0