Abstract
This paper investigates the negotiation problem in a supply chain in which a supplier can realize cost savings if she reaches an agreement with a retailer to use the retailers accurate market data for production planning. We study the participants behavior in an asymmetric and a symmetric information scenario and model the experimental study as a reverse ultimatum game. The main finding is that the revelation of information in the game leads to higher payoffs for both parties and to a higher welfare.
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Rief, D., van Dinther, C. Negotiation for Cooperation in Logistics Networks: An Experimental Study. Group Decis Negot 19, 211–226 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-010-9193-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-010-9193-7