Abstract
In this paper we extend the negative known results about No Show Paradox in Condorcet voting functions and correspondences to the contexts of k-functions and k-correspondences, in which the outcome of the voting process is a unique k-committee (set of k candidates) or a family of k-committees. The main result of the paper states that for every Condorcet k-function and for every Condorcet k-correspondence, there are situations in which every optimistic or pessimistic voter with some specific preferences could manipulate the election by abstaining.
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Pérez, J., Jimeno, J.L. & García, E. No Show Paradox in Condorcet k-voting Procedures. Group Decis Negot 21, 291–303 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-010-9191-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-010-9191-9