Abstract
This study examined how order of contribution in a sequential public goods dilemma affected cooperation. Under a sequential protocol of play, players of different levels of efficacy made decisions one after another. We contrasted a High-to-low versus Low-to-high Efficacy order in a nine-person game. Under a High-to-low order, high-efficacy players made decisions in positions 1–3, medium-efficacy players in positions 4–6, and low-efficacy players in positions 7–9. Under a Low-to-high order, the positions of high- and low-efficacy players were reversed. We hypothesized that cooperation rates would be higher in the High-to-low order that high-efficacy players (assigned in early positions), who would likely cooperate, would induce subsequent players to cooperate also. We found the anticipated effect that cooperation rate was higher in the High-to-low than the Low-to-high efficacy order. The efficacy order effect was the most prominent when people perceived that their group was becoming uncooperative. This study illustrates a new type of structural solution to social dilemmas that by systematically assigning people to different sequential positions, a group can be made more or less cooperative.
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Au, W.T., Chung, M.W. Effect of Order of Contribution in a Sequential Public Goods Dilemma. Group Decis Negot 16, 437–449 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-006-9067-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-006-9067-1