Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the semantic relation between continental drift and plate tectonics. The numerous attempts to account for this case in either Kuhnian or Lakatosian terms have been convincingly dismissed by Rachel Laudan (PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Symposia and Invited Papers, 1978), who nevertheless acknowledged that there was not yet a plausible alternative to explain the so called “geological revolution”. Several decades later, the epistemological side of this revolution has received much attention (Ruse in The darwinian paradigm, essays on its history, philosophy and religious implications. London, Routledge, 1981/1989; Thagard in Conceptual revolutions. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992; Marvin in Metascience 10:208–217, 2001; Oreskes in Plate tectonics: an insiders’ history of the modern theory of the earth. Westview Press, Boulder, 2003), while the semantic relation between drift theory and plate tectonics has remained mainly unexplored. In studying this case under a new light, the notion of embedding, as distinguished from other sorts of intertheoretical relations (Moulines in Cognitio Humana—Dynamik des Wissens und der Werte. XVII, Institut für Philosophie der Universität Leipzig, Leipzig, 1996, Time, chance, and reduction: philosophical aspects of statistical mechanics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, Metatheoria 1(2):11–27, 2011), will have a particular significance. After formally analyzing the relationship between continental drift and plate tectonics, it will become evident that the models of drift theory are part of the models of plate tectonics, thereby fulfilling the conditions for embedding. All theoretical concepts from drift theory are presupposed in some theoretical concepts from plate tectonics, and all empirical concepts of the former are shared by the latter. Furthermore, all the successful paradigmatic applications of continental drift are also successful applications of plate tectonics. As a consequence, under the label “geological revolution”, we actually find a salient historical case of cumulative progress across theory change.
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Notes
In structuralist literature (Balzer et al. 1987, 167–177), the notion of a theory-net is defined by establishing two conditions: 1) that there should exist a finite non-empty set of theory-elements TE and a specialization relation σ; 2) that the specialization relation be restricted to the set TE. Given that the definition of a theory-net presupposes that of specialisation, the principle defining features of this should be mentioned, even if in passing. They are as follows: a) equality between the classes of potential models and partially potential models of the respective related theory-elements; and, b) the inclusion of the current class of models, the class of constraints, the class of links and that of intended applications of the (resulting) specialized theory, respectively, in the class of actual models, the class of constraints, the class of links, and that of the intended applications of the theory that is specialized. Expressed in other terms, two theory-elements that are related by means of a specialization relation will share their conceptual apparatus, while they will diverge with regard to the scope of their laws and, consequently, with regard to the extension of their classes of intended applications, since the theory-element that specializes restricts the laws and the empirical scope of the specialized theory-element.
One of the few places (if not the only one) where Kuhn elaborates on this matter is 1962/1970, 95–97.
The reader should note that the symbol ‘\(\hat{ \in }\)’ expresses a relation between a component of a structure and the structure itself, and so it is not to be confused with the element-of symbol ‘∈’ used later, which expresses a relation between an element and a set.
Here we are assuming the notion of substructure that is standard in model theory. Under this characterization, a structure S is a substructure of other S’ when the domains of S are proper or improper subsets of the domains of S’, and, therefore, the relations of S are restrictions over the relations of S’.
Function ‘r’ assigns to every actual model ‘m’ the corresponding partial potential model ‘y’ that results from cutting the T-theoretical concepts from ‘m’.
Furthermore, in Kuhn’s later proposal (1983, 670–1), he explicitly characterizes the notion of incommensurability as a local or partial relation between theories.
By stressing the importance of evidence quality as the driving force in the career of geological theories, she therefore also opposes the popular view put forward by Stephen Jay Gould (1977), which implied that the initial rejection of drift theory was due to a lack of an adequate mechanism to move continents through a static ocean floor.
Kinetic friction is thus one of the parameters common to both DRIFT and TEC. To be more faithful to the historical background, it would be necessary to distinguish between viscous friction and rigid friction. Wegener postulated a viscous friction that would operate between continents and sea floors, since he conjectured that there was a process of plastic yielding of the oceanic "sima" and likewise a process of plastic folding (mountain building) of the continental "sial" upon lateral compression. On the other hand, by adding the concept of rigid plate, TEC also contains viscous friction both at the plates' bottom (convection as a plate driving force) and between continents as well as rigid friction at the plates' margins (as the cause of earthquakes). However, for reasons of parsimony, the above distinctions have not been included in the formal reconstruction of both theories.
In ‘xDi’ ‘i’ is a sub-index of a sub-index (‘T’). The same goes for ‘xTk’, ‘yDi’, yTk’.
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Acknowledgements
I am thankful to José Díez for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Thanks also to the participants in the 8th and 9th editions of the Latin American Conference on Structuralist Metatheory (Mexico DF 2012, Barcelona 2014), where I had the chance to get a valuable feedback on different aspects of this work. Thanks specially to Matías Aimino and Adriana Gonzalo fo their illuminating discussion on the principle of isostasy. My gratitude also to Jurgen Strehlau for his useful suggestions to improve my analysis of the historical case. Finally, this paper has greatly benefited from comments by three anonymous referees. This research was financially supported by the research projects "Pragmatics as the Driven Force Behind the Study of Semantic Flexibility: Conversational Contexts and Theoretical Contexts" (FII 2012-33881, Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness) and "Models and Theories in Physical, Biological and Social Sciences" (PICT-2014-1741, ANPCyT, Argentina).
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Caamaño-Alegre, M. Drift Theory and Plate Tectonics: A Case of Embedding in Geology. Found Sci 23, 17–35 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-016-9505-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-016-9505-8