Abstract
Credit default swaps (CDSs) are among the most successful financial innovations of recent years, which is reflected in the rapidly expanding market. CDS trading occurs in the over-the-counter market, which relies heavily on broker intermediation to arrange trades. We provide empirical evidence that liquidity in the voice brokered market varies with the particulars of the CDS contracts and that the differences in market structure is reflected in the costs of liquidity. Moreover, the brokered and direct interdealer trading markets seem to be well integrated; thus the higher liquidity costs in the brokered market may reflect the value of intermediation. Hybrid market structures, which combine voice brokerage with an electronic platform, are discussed as a viable alternative to fully automated trading systems.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Rime (2003) mentions that active currencies in the FX market such as USD/EUR and USD/Yen have shifted almost completely to electronic trading, while less active currencies have not.
Within the last decade, alternative credit derivative products have been developed to satisfy the different needs of counterparties. The basic choices of credit derivatives comprise credit default products, credit spread products, and total return products. Credit default products are commonly used to offset default risk, whereas credit spread products offset the whole credit risk, i.e. the risk of increasing or decreasing spreads. The third type, total return products, transfers both credit and market risk between counterparties. More advanced forms of credit derivatives include credit-linked notes, basket credit derivatives, and asset-backed securities.
Price discovery can be defined as ‘the efficient and timely incorporation of the information implicit in investor trading into market prices’ (Lehmann 2002).
For example, T-zero, a recent spin-off from Creditex, offers standardized electronic post-trade messaging and increased system-to-system connectivity between market participants. The system is also linked to DTCC and automatically sends affirmed trades for same-day legal execution. Thomson’s TradeWeb also offers an STP platform with a direct link to DTCC’s Deriv/SERV trade affirmation and matching service. In addition, TradeWeb CDS users are able to confirm trades seamlessly, view trade confirmation status, and validate open net CDS positions. SwapWire provides a network for trade confirmation in the OTC market and recently updated its system to offer support for ISDA’s novation protocol of September 2005. For instance, this functionality can be used by buy-side clients, who often use deal novation as a mechanism for the early exit of derivative positions.
Markit RED (Reference Entity Database) currently serves as the industry standard and confirms the legal relationship between reference entities that trade in the OTC CDS market and their associated reference obligations (so-called pairs). Markit creates a unique alpha-numeric key called CLIPS (CUSIP linked entity Markit code) to identify both the entity and the pair. RED is seen as a necessary ingredient for the facilitation of electronic trading of CDSs because it helps to minimize the operational risks inherent in the matching/clearing process. As CLIPS have been mandatory since June 2005 for dealers matching on DTCC, increasingly more IDBs will use RED to generate DTCC-eligible trade data.
In July 2002, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) began to report transactions in around 500 bonds through Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), which constituted a major step towards the market’s transparency.
The iTraxx index consists of the 125 most liquid single name CDSs and was exclusively licensed to Eurex by the International Index Company (IIC) in July 2005.
Recent literature has investigated the liquidity premium in bond spreads (Janosi et al. 2002; Houweling et al. 2005), while credit default swaps are modeled to have no liquidity premium due to several reasons. Longstaff et al. (2005) provide the most comprehensive discussion on the issue, noting that CDS are contracts that can be set up arbitrarily, while securities are fixed in supply. This makes CDSs invulnerable to the ‘squeezing’ effects applicable to bonds. Furthermore, if liquidation is wanted, the counterparty simply enters into a new CDS in the opposite direction. Finally, it is quite easy to sell and buy protection with CDS, while it is difficult and costly to short bonds (pp. 2219–2220). Despite these reasons, which neglect the presence of a liquidity premium in prices for modeling purposes, it should be realized that these points show only a relative unimportance with respect to bonds.
Bid-ask spreads have obvious limitations. However, it is difficult to define a single measure that reflects all dimensions of liquidity, leaving the bid-ask spread as a good proxy for analysis.
The restructuring dummy has a value of ‘0’ for the Old Restructuring (OR) clause where minimum restrictions on delivery option are present; ‘1’ for Modified Modified Restructuring (MMR), the valid clause for Europe after June 2003, which constrains the old clause; and ‘2’ for Modified Restructuring (MR), the valid clause for North American entities. The latter is the most restrictive clause overall and reduces the value of the delivery option.
Robustness checks executed by taking the log values of ratings and maturity lead to similar results.
In order to check for robustness, we have also tested regressions with the relative bid-ask spread as the dependent variable. The relative spreads are calculated by dividing the absolute spread by the midpoint of the quotes. In our regression, this affects the seniority, maturity, and rating variables. Due to the fact that subordinated CDSs have higher midpoints that enter into this calculation than the senior CDSs, we have reached parameter estimates with a reverse sign for the rank variable. The same is true for the rating variable in regression (1), since the lower ratings simply indicate a higher midpoint division. Similarly, these regressions had a negative estimate for the maturity variable, which is most likely not because of changing absolute spreads but instead due to increasing midpoints for higher maturities.
In order to eliminate month-end effects, mid-month data are used.
Significance is also reached when IDB midpoints are used as the explanatory variable.
A similar analysis has been carried with relative spreads. Due to the fact that relative spreads are computed by a division of the midpoints, the significance of credit quality is in the opposite direction for Tables 4 and 7. This is most likely due to midpoints increasing stronger than the absolute spreads for low credit quality entities.
References
Acharya VV, Johnson TC (2007) Insider trading in credit derivatives. J Financ Econ 84:110–141
Bagehot W (1971) The only game in town. Financ Anal J 27:12–14, 22
Bank for International Settlements (2005) OTC derivatives market activity in the second half of 2004. Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department
Barclay MJ, Hendershott T, Kotz K (2006) Automation versus intermediation: evidence from treasuries going off the run. J Finance 61:2395–2414
Bessembinder H, Venkataraman K (2004) Does an electronic stock exchange need an upstairs market? J Financ Econ 73:3–36
Bessembinder H, Maxwell W, Venkataraman K (2006) Market transparency, liquidity externalities and institutional trading costs in corporate bonds. J Financ Econ 82:251–288
Biais B (1993) Price formation and equilibrium liquidity in fragmented and centralized markets. J Finance 48:157–185
Blanco R, Brennan S, Marsh IW (2005) An empirical analysis of the dynamic relationship between investment-grade bonds and credit default swaps. J Finance 60:2255–2281
Bloomfield R, O’Hara M (2000) Can transparent markets survive? J Financ Econ 55:425–459
Boni L, Leach C (2004) Expandable limit order markets. J Financ Mark 7:145–185
Brenner M, Eldor R, Hauser S (2001) The price of options illiquidity. J Finance 56:789–805
British Bankers’ Association (2004) BBA Credit Derivatives Report 2003/2004, British Bankers’ Association, UK
Copeland TE, Galai D (1983) Information effects on the bid-ask spread. J Finance 38:1457–1469
Demsetz H (1968) The cost of transacting. Q J Econ 82:35–53
Deuskar P, Gupta A, Subrahmanyam MG (2006) Liquidity effects in interest rate options markets: premium or discount? Unpublished working paper, New York University, NY
D’Souza C, Gaa C, Yang J (2003) An empirical analysis of liquidity and order flow in the brokered interdealer market for government of Canada bonds. Unpublished working paper, Bank of Canada, 2003-28, Canada
Duffie D (1999) Credit swap valuation. Financ Anal J 55:73–87
Duffie D, Garleanu N, Pedersen LH (2005) Over-the-counter markets. Econometrica 73:1815–1847
Easley D, Kiefer NM, O’Hara M et al (1996) Liquidity, information, and infrequently traded stocks. J Finance 51:1405–1436
Flood MD, Huisman R, Koedijk KG et al (1999) Search costs: the neglected spread component. Unpublished working paper, University of California, Berkeley, CA
Garbade KD (1978) The effect of interdealer brokerage on the transactional characteristics of dealer markets. J Bus 51:477–498
Glosten LR, Milgrom PR (1985) Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders. J Financ Econ 14:71–100
Grossman SJ (1992) The information role of upstairs and downstairs markets. J Bus 65:509–528
Ho TSY, Stoll HR (1983) The dynamics of dealer markets under competition. J Finance 38:1053–1074
Houweling P, Vorst T (2005) Pricing default swaps: empirical evidence. J Int Money Financ 24:1200–1225
Houweling P, Mentink A, Vorst T (2005) Comparing possible proxies of corporate bond liquidity. J Bank Financ 29:1331–1358
Huang RD, Cai J, Wang X (2002) Information-based trading in the treasury note interdealer broker market. J Financ Intermed 11:269–296
Hull J, White A (Fall 2000) Valuing credit default swaps I: no counterparty default risk. J Deriv 8:29–40
Hull J, White A (Spring 2001) Valuing credit default swaps II: modeling default correlations. J Deriv 8:12–21
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (2004) ISDA 2004 Operations Benchmarking Survey, ISDA Inc.
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (2006) ISDA 2006 Operations Benchmarking Survey, ISDA Inc.
Janosi T, Jarrow R, Yildirim Y (2002) Estimating expected losses and liquidity discounts implicit in debt prices. J Risk 5:1–38
Lehmann BN (2002) Some desiderata for the measurement of price discovery across markets. J Financ Mark 5:259–276
Longstaff FA, Mithal S, Neis E (2005) Corporate yield spreads: default risk or liquidity? New evidence from the credit default swap market. J Finance 60:2213–2253
Madhavan A (1996) Security prices and market transparency. J Financ Intermed 5:255–283
Madhavan A, Porter D, Weaver D (2005) Should securities markets be transparent? J Financ Mark 8:265–287
Odders-White ER, Ready MJ (2006) Credit ratings and stock liquidity. Rev Financ Stud 19:119–157
O’Hara M (1995) Market microstructure theory, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell
Pagano M, Roell A (1996) Transparency and liquidity: a comparison of auction and dealer markets with informed trading. J Finance 51:579–611
Reiss PC, Werner IM (1998) Does risk sharing motivate interdealer trading? J Finance 53:1657–1703
Reiss PC, Werner IM (2005) Anonymity, adverse selection, and the sorting of interdealer trades. Rev Financ Stud 18:599–636
Rime D (2003) New electronic trading systems in foreign exchange markets. In: Jones DC (ed.) New economy handbook. Amsterdam: Academic Press/Elsevier, pp. 471–507
Schwartz RA, Francioni R (2004) Equity markets in action: the fundamentals of liquidity, market structure and trading. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons
Stoll H (2000) Friction. J Finance 55:1479–1514
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Gündüz, Y., Lüdecke, T. & Uhrig-Homburg, M. Trading Credit Default Swaps via Interdealer Brokers. J Finan Serv Res 32, 141–159 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-007-0012-5
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-007-0012-5