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Trait perceptions influence economic out-group bias: lab and field evidence from Vietnam

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Abstract

Group favoritism is typically directed toward in-group members and against out-group members, but these cross-group effects often vary. Little is known about why group effects on economic choices vary. We use a survey method developed in social psychology to measure stereotyped attitudes of one group toward another. These attitudes are then associated with prosociality in five experimental games (also using an unusual amount of individual-level sociodemographic control). We present evidence from an artificial field experiment of a majority group with high status (Vietnamese) exhibiting no disfavoritism toward a lower-status out-group (Khmer) and typical disfavoritism to a second out-group (Chinese). Both Vietnamese and Chinese groups see the Khmer as warm but incompetent, attitudes which seem to activate empathy rather than contempt. The results suggest that measuring between-group stereotype attitudes can be used to predict the sign of cross-group favoritism in other natural settings.

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Notes

  1. Social preference theories and measures have also influenced cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Fehr and Camerer (2007), Tricomi et al. (2010) and Ruff and Fehr (2014)).

  2. See also Ball et al. (2001), Goette et al. (2006), Charness et al. (2007), Chen and Li (2009) and Abbink et al. (2010).

  3. See Sobel (2002), Akerlof and Kranton (2005), Croson and Gneezy (2009) and Fehr et al. (2009) for reviews.

  4. Friesen et al. (2012) report outgroup favoritism by Canadian children of East Asian ethnicity toward White and South Asian children. Bauer et al. (2012) report partial outgroup favouritism among children (in an envy game, but not in a sharing game) in Georgia and Sierra Leone who were unaffected by wars in those areas.

  5. Sociodemographic controls in earlier studies included race and survey measures related to trust (Glaeser et al. 2000), gender (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001), age and gender (Burns 2006; van der Merwe and Burns 2008), measures of land, house type and education (Fehr et al. 2008; Hoff et al. 2011). The most extensive set of controls—age, gender, income and education—are in Buchan et al. (2011). Note that age and gender are useful controls for many reasons, but since they do not covary much with group ethnicity they are not a control for whether group effects are due to other variables. Our study includes all these measures (except for land, though it is highly correlated with wealth in most of the world, which we include) along with other measures. Bahry and Wilson (2004) use gender and age individual controls in comparing behavior among Tatarstan and Sakha (former USSR republics), as well as (experimental) group level controls for other variables. They find no group effects on behavior in trust games, which is a reminder that including more controls could conceivably account for part or all of the apparent group differences shown in other studies with fewer or no controls. Chen et al. (2014) use the novel approach (in experimental economics) of priming of ethnicity, finding effects in coordination and PD games.

  6. Note also that ethnicity is clearly established (i.e., subjects self-report confidently).

  7. Battle-of-the-sexes games results are not reported in this paper.

  8. Yamagishi et al. (2013) conducted an experiment with similar games to our study, spread over three and a half years, and found consistency within individuals in pro-social across different games.

  9. In VK1 and VK8 villages, Vietnamese and Khmer subjects were divided into white and red groups, respectively. In villages VK 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, we divided subjects into four groups by ethnicity and income. High-income Vietnamese, low-income Vietnamese, high-income Khmer, and low-income Khmer were assigned white, black, red and pink ID tags, respectively. The instruction said the colors of their identification tags were based on ethnicity and income. In each game, subjects were first asked their decisions if their opponents were either white or black groups (Vietnamese), and red or pink groups (Khmer). Afterward, they were asked their choices contingent on each of the four color groups. Similarly, in VC villages, subjects were divided into four groups, white, black, red and pink (high-income Vietnamese, low-income Vietnamese, high-income Chinese, and low-income Chinese, respectively). The subjects were first asked their decisions for each game if their opponents were either white or black groups (Vietnamese), then if their opponents were either red or pink groups (Chinese). In this paper, we report the effects of ethnicity on decisions in games and leave the analysis of ethnicity and income effects for future analysis.

  10. We prepared Vietnamese instruction for Vietnamese and Chinese subjects, and Khmer instruction for Khmer subjects. Vietnamese instruction was provided to Khmer subjects upon request.

  11. Our longer working paper discusses measures and possible effects of social distance and political power (see Tanaka and Camerer 2012). We exclude these analyses in this paper because there were no large robust effects (as also found by Bahry and Wilson (2004) in former USSR countries).

  12. Brañas-Garza (2006) finds when subjects know that receivers are poor, they send significantly higher amounts. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) conducted dictator games with two major ethnic groups in Israel and found no significant in-group bias.

  13. The same is true for trust games (see Table A.6).

  14. Bernhard et al. (2006), Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), Goette et al. (2006), Hoff et al. (2011).

  15. Glaeser et al. (2000) find an ingroup effect on trustee money repaid. Bouckaert and Dhaene (2004) find no ingroup effects among Belgian businessmen. In a protocol with partner choice Bornhorst et al. (2010) find no ingroup favoritism but Northern Europeans cultivate better reputations and therefore earn more than Southerners. Buchan et al. (2011) find that public good contributions to a cross-country “world group” depends on a measure of global social identity (controlling for four key sociodemographic variables).

  16. The “neighbor” question is used in the World Values Survey.

  17. For example, Todorov et al. (2005) famously found that competence judged from politicians’ headshot photos was strongly correlated with their vote shares in actual elections.

  18. The “neighbor” question is used in the World Values Survey.

  19. For example, Todorov et al. (2005) famously found that competence judged from politicians’ headshot photos was strongly correlated with their vote shares in actual elections.

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Acknowledgments

The Russell Sage Foundation (TT) and Betty and Gordon Moore Foundation (CFC) supported this research. Thanks to many tireless research assistants, the audience at Stanford SITE (2009), and two referees and editor David Cooper for helpful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. World Bank, Washington, DC, USA

    Tomomi Tanaka

  2. California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 91106, USA

    Colin F. Camerer

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  1. Tomomi Tanaka
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  2. Colin F. Camerer
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Correspondence to Colin F. Camerer.

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Tanaka, T., Camerer, C.F. Trait perceptions influence economic out-group bias: lab and field evidence from Vietnam. Exp Econ 19, 513–534 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9452-1

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