Abstract
This paper analyzes the use of a cost-free reward mechanism in the exploitation of a common property resource. We implement an experimental study involving a two-stages game where agents first decide resource appropriation and then have the opportunity to distribute cost-free bestowals. We observe that subjects link the two activities in such a way that appropriation determines the distribution of bestowals which in turn contributes maintaining low appropriation levels, thus avoiding the destruction of the common resource. Not all the potential bestowals are distributed, however.
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Financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (project ECO2009-12836) is gratefully acknowledged. Montserrat Viladrich-Grau acknowledges the support of the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Research Network and of the Government of Catalonia. We thank Frederic Udina, Jordi Brandts, Emilio Domínguez, Jorge Nieto and members of SEED research group for helpful comments and discussions. We also thank the helpful comments of two anonymous referees.
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Osés-Eraso, N., Viladrich-Grau, M. The sustainability of the commons: giving and receiving. Exp Econ 14, 458–481 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-011-9276-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-011-9276-6