Abstract
We examine choices in two-player extensive-form games that give subjects opportunities for individualistic as well as other-regarding behavior, and where each subject makes choices in a variety of games. Following an extensive search over models, where we estimate a single parameter vector for all the games rather than different parameter vectors for each game, we find that (1) the level-n model organizes the data well, (2) other-regarding behaviors in these games appear to consist primarily of egalitarian and utilitarian behaviors, and (3) there is no significant evidence for reciprocal behavior.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Blount, S. (1995). When social outcomes aren’t fair: the effect of causal attributions on preferences. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 63(2), 131–144.
Bolton, G., Brandts, J., & Ockenfels, A. (1998). Measuring motivations for the reciprocal responses observed in simple dilemma games. Experimental Economics, 1(3), 207–219.
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 817–869.
Cooper, D., & Van Huyck, J. (2003). Evidence on the equivalence of the strategic and extensive form representation of games. Journal of Economic Theory, 110, 290–308.
Cox, J. C., & Deck, C. A. (2005). On the nature of reciprocal motives. Economic Inquiry, 43(3), 623–635.
Croson, R., & Miller, M. (2003). Explaining the relationship between actions and beliefs: projection vs. reaction. Mimeo.
Deck, C. (2001). A test of game-theoretic and behavioral models of play in exchange and insurance environments. American Economic Review, 91, 1546–1555.
Fehr, E., & Gachter, S. (2000). Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 159–181.
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817–868.
Schotter, A., Weigelt, K., & Wilson, C. (1994). A laboratory investigation of multi-person rationality and presentation effects. Games and Economic Behavior, 6, 445–468.
Stahl, D. (2003). Mixture models of individual heterogeneity. In Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. London: MacMillan.
Stahl, D., & Wilson, P. (1995). On players’ models of other players: theory and experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 218–254.
Stahl, D., & Haruvy, E. (2008a). Level-n bounded rationality in two-player two-stage games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 65, 41–61. www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Stahl/ut10_4a.pdf.
Stahl, D., & Haruvy, E. (2008b). Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior, 63, 292–307.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Electronic Supplementary Material
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Stahl, D.O., Haruvy, E. Testing theories of behavior for extensive-form two-player two-stage games. Exp Econ 12, 242–251 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9212-6
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9212-6