Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Reciprocity in the workplace

  • Published:
Experimental Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Using combined experimental and survey data, this paper provides empirical evidence that firm productivity is related to worker’s pro-social behavior in the workplace. At the firm level, we find a strong positive relationship between firm productivity and reciprocating behavior among workers. Investigating workers’ individual behavior we find a similar, strong relationship when regressing earnings, a proxy for productivity, on reciprocity. To address simultaneity we use an instrumental variable approach and find that the initial estimate was upwards biased, presumably because it did not take into account the positive feedback from earnings to reciprocity. The new coefficient remains substantially above zero, but it is statistically insignificant.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Agell, J., & Lundborg, P. (1995). Theories of pay and unemployment: Survey evidence from Swedish manufacturing firms. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97(2), 295–307.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Akerlof, G. A. (1982). Labor contracts as partial gift exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97, 543–569.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ashraf, N., Bohnet, I., & Piankov, N. (2006). Decomposing trust and trustworthiness. Experimental Economics, 9(3), 193–208.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barr, A., & Packard, T. (2002). Revealed preferences and self-insurance: Can we learn from the self-employed in Chile? World Bank Policy Research working paper 2754.

  • Bartel, A. (2004). Human resource management and organizational performance: Evidence from retail banking. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 57(2).

  • Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Review of Economic Studies, 70(244), 489–520.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity and social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122–142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bewley, T. F. (1999). Why wages don’t fall during a recession. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Binswanger, H.P. (1980). Attitudes towards risk: experimental measurement in rural India. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62(3), 395–407.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blinder, A.S., & Choi, D.H. (1990). A shred of evidence on theories of wage stickiness. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(4), 1003–1015.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bohnet, I., & Zeckhouser, R. (2004). Trust, risk and betrayal. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 55(4), 467–484.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bowles, S., Gintis, H., & Osborne, M. (2001). The determinants of earnings: A behavioral approach. Journal of Economic Literature, 39(4), 1137–1176.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bureau of the Census (1998). First findings from the EQW national employer survey. EQW Catalog RE01.

  • Carpenter, J., & Cardenas, J. C. (2004). Three themes on field experiments and economic development. In J. Carpenter, G. Harrison, & J. List (Eds.), Field experiments in economics. London/Amsterdam: JAI/Elsevier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carpenter, J., & Seki, E. (2005). Do social preferences increase productivity? Field experimental evidence from fishermen in Toyama bay. IZA Discussion paper 1697.

  • Carpenter, J., Burks, S., & Verhoogen, E. (2004). Comparing students to workers: The effects of social framing on behavior in distribution games. In J. Carpenter, G. Harrison, & J. List (Eds.), Field experiments in economics. London/Amsterdam: JAI/Elsevier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Charness, G. (1998). Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation. Economics Working paper 283, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

  • Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 47(2), 268–298.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (2002). Psychological foundations of incentives. European Economic Review, 46(4-5), 687–724.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, E., & Gachter, S. (1998). Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of homo reciprocans. European Economic Review, 42, 845–859.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, E., Gachter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: Experimental evidence. Econometrica, 65(4), 833–860.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1998). Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets. European Economic Review, 42, 1–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., von Rosenbladt, B., Schupp, J., & Wagner, G.G.. (2003). A nationwide laboratory examining trust and trustworthiness by integrating behavioural experiments into representative surveys. CEPR Discussion paper 3858.

  • Green, F., & Machin, S., & Wilkeman (1998). The meaning and determinants of skill shortages. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 60(2), 165–187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harrison, G. W., & List, J. A. (2004). Field experiments. Journal of Economic Literature, 42(4), 1013–1059.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holm, H., & Nystedt, P. (2005). Intra-generational trust—a semi-experimental study of trust among different generations. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58, 403–419.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1990). Regulating trade among agents. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146, 85–105.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huck, S., Kubler, D., & Weibull, J. (2001). Social norms and economic incentives in firms. Working paper 466, Working paper series in economics and finance, Stockholm School of Economics.

  • Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., & Thaler (2000). Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market. In D. Kahneman & A. Tversky (Eds.), Choices, values and frames (pp. 317–334). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karlan, D. (2005). Using experimental economics to measure social capital and predict financial decisions. American Economic Review, 95(5), 1688–1699.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaufman, R. (1984). On wage stickiness in Britain’s competitive sector. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 22(1), 101–112.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levine, D. (1993). Fairness, markets and ability to pay: Evidence from compensation executives. American Economic Review, 83(5), 1241–1259.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007). What do laboratory experiments measuring social preferences reveal about the real world. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(2), 153–174.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Offer, A. (1997). Between the gift and the market: The economy of regard. The Economic History Review, 50(3), 450–476.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Polanyi, K. (1957). The great transformation. The political and economic origins of our time. Boston: Beacon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review, 83, 1281–1302.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rabin, M. (1998). Psychology and economics. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(1), 11–46.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schotter, A. (1998). Worker trust, system vulnerability, and the performance of work groups. In A. Ben-Ner & L. Putterman (Eds.), Economics, values and organization (pp. 364–407). Cambridge: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soderbom, M., Teal, F., & Harding, A. (2006). The determinants of survival among African manufacturing firms. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 54(3), 533–555.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Teal, F. (2000). Real wages and the demand for skilled and unskilled male labour in Ghana’s manufacturing sector: 1991–1995. Journal of Development Economics, 61, 447–461.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Pieter Serneels.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Barr, A., Serneels, P. Reciprocity in the workplace. Exp Econ 12, 99–112 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9202-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9202-8

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation