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Relational Autonomy and the Social Dynamics of Paternalism

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Abstract

In this paper I look at various ways that interpersonal and social relations can be seen as required for autonomy. I then consider cases where those dynamics might play out or not in potentially paternalistic situations. In particular, I consider cases of especially vulnerable persons who are attempting to reconstruct a sense of practical identity required for their autonomy and need the potential paternalist’s aid in doing so. I then draw out the implications for standard liberal principles of (anti-) paternalism, specifically in clinical or therapeutic situations. The picture of potential paternalism that emerges here is much more of a dynamic, interpersonal scenario rather than a case of two separate individuals making decisions independent of each other.

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Notes

  1. See, for example Dworkin 1972; Kleinig 1983, and Feinberg 1986.

  2. These distinctions are explained in Dworkin 2010.

  3. For exceptions to this, see Arneson 2005; Hanna 2011.

  4. It may in many cases be very difficult to distinguish motives aimed at the person’s moral improvement from those aimed at her personal or non-moral good; consider, for example, attempting to steer a person away from a life of prostitution on the grounds that it is so demeaning as to be unhealthy for her.

    Also, I focus here on acts of paternalism and motives of paternalists as if these are separable elements. This is the standard approach, though some have argued that we must look at the compounds of reasons and actions to determine whether paternalism is justified in given instances: see Grille 2007.

  5. I refer here to strands of political thought inspired by Kant. The other, Millian, brand of liberalism fixes limits to paternalism by reference to the long-term good of the subject, as well as the value of individuality, arguing the such interferences typically make people worse off. This comes from either lack of knowledge of the good of the subject by the paternalist, the tendency to overstep, or the value of individuality itself – pursuing one’s own good in one’s own way. For discussion, see On Liberty; see also Arneson 1980, 1989.

  6. Feinberg 1986, p. 61.

  7. This refers to the distinction between “global” and “local” autonomy. For discussion, see Dworkin 1989, 12–20, and Christman 1991. Diana Meyers makes a similar distinction between “programmatic” and “episodic” autonomy. See Meyers 1987.

  8. Writers who have analyzed the concept of autonomy in detail recently include Gerald Dworkin (1989), Alfred Mele (1995), Diana T. Meyers (1989), Bernard Berofsky (1995), and Marylin Friedman (2003). For surveys of such literature, see Christman 2002; Buss 2002; Oshana 2006, and Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000.

  9. Meyers 1987; Mackenzie 2000.

  10. This should not be confused with other uses of that notion in philosophy (such as in existentialism or in explicating the virtue of integrity) though some relation to those uses might be found.

  11. See Frankfurt 1987 and 1992 and Dworkin 1989.

  12. See Christman 2009.

  13. Indeed, the literature on relational autonomy, discussed below, is largely motivated by such concerns. See, e.g., Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000 and Oshana 2006. Also of relevance here is the way that Jonathan Lear, examines the case of Plenty Coups, the leader of the Crow Indian nation in the U.S. whose traditional tribal way of life had been completely destroyed. On Lear’s analysis, Plenty Coups’s values, motives and social self-understanding was thereby fractured, making him unable to find a way forward until he was able to reconstruct a sense of social identity in a new setting. See Lear 2006.

  14. See, for example, see Jaggar 1988, 29; for an overview, see the essays in Meyers, ed. 1997, Part 4. For general discussions of relational autonomy, see Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000.

  15. See, e.g., Oshana 2006.

  16. Mackenzie 2008; Benson 1994 and 2000, Grovier 1993, and Westlund 2009.

  17. As Nicholas Kristoff writes about trafficked women who failed to escape their captors when they could this way: “The girls typically explain that they didn’t try to escape because of a complex web of emotions, including fear of the pimp but also a deluded affection and a measure of Stockholm syndrome.” (New York Times, April 19, 2012)

  18. See, e.g., Westlund 2009.

  19. For further discussion of this position, see Christman 2009, ch. 8.

  20. Mackenzie 2008. Page numbers immediately following refer to this text.

  21. Anderson and Honneth 2005, 137. See also Honneth 2001

  22. For example Benson and Grovier emphasize recognition of self-trust (Benson 1994; Grovier 1993) while Westlund stresses “answerability” (Westlund 2009).

  23. “Stereotype Threat and Relational Autonomy”, paper presented at APA Central Division Meetings. February, 2012.

  24. McLeod and Sherwin 2000, 79.

  25. For an overview of the phenomenon (from the perspective of an activist), see Bales et.al. 2009.

  26. See, for example, Mackenzie et al. 2007; Halpern 2001; Sherwin 2000, and Salmon and Young 2009.

  27. Halpern 2001.

  28. Halpern 2001, 116.

  29. Halpern 2001, 112. “Suffering may impair people’s self-efficacy as well as their ability to imagine goals for the future. Yet these two things are essential for exercising autonomy.” (ibid, 104)

  30. She writes, for example, that “physicians have a duty to seek to understand of the specific affective worlds of their patients, especially when they are suffering.” (ibid, 122)

  31. My view is developed in Christman 2009. However, this dialogical view of the self borrows much from many other highly developed theories, such as that of Charles Taylor (1989), Jürgen Habermas (1998), and others.

  32. Classic works include Noddings 1984 and Ruddick 2002, among others.

  33. For example, continuing to see personal autonomy as a core value protects against certain abuses of caring relationships, such as the over-burdensome nature of responsibility for others that relations of care sometimes entail. For discussion, see Friedman 2003, chs. 4 and 6.

  34. The author is very grateful to Michael Kühler and Annette Dufner for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA

    John Christman

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Christman, J. Relational Autonomy and the Social Dynamics of Paternalism. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 17, 369–382 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9449-9

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