Abstract
Craver claims that mechanistic explanation is ontic, while Bechtel claims that it is epistemic. While this distinction between ontic and epistemic explanation originates with Salmon, the ideas have changed in the modern debate on mechanistic explanation, where the frame of the debate is changing. I will explore what Bechtel and Craver’s claims mean, and argue that good mechanistic explanations must satisfy both ontic and epistemic normative constraints on what is a good explanation. I will argue for ontic constraints by drawing on Craver’s work in Sect. 2.1, and argue for epistemic constraints by drawing on Bechtel’s work in Sect. 2.2. Along the way, I will argue that Bechtel and Craver actually agree with this claim. I argue that we should not take either kind of constraints to be fundamental, in Sect. 3, and close in Sect. 4 by considering what remains at stake in making a distinction between ontic and epistemic constraints on mechanistic explanation. I suggest that we should not concentrate on either kind of constraint, to the neglect of the other, arguing for the importance of seeing the relationship as one of integration.
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Notes
I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting a useful clarification along these lines.
In the pre-publication manuscript, they write: ‘Mechanistic explanation is an epistemic practice. There are norms governing such a practice—namely, that explaining a target phenomenon requires an understanding of the systemic activities that locally produce it, which in turn requires revealing the mechanism’s internal structure, function, and organization’ (Wright and Bechte 2007, p. 18). But this does not appear in the shorter published version.
This does not require manipulation in Woodward’s sense.
Thanks to Julia Tanney for originally suggesting to me this endlessly useful example.
I thank Michael Strevens for pressing me on this point.
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Acknowledgements
I have to thank Bill Bechtel, Carl Craver, Toby Friend, Bert Leuridan, John Pemberton, Federica Russo, Christoph Schultz, Michael Strevens, Adam White, and other members of the audiences of Causality and Explanation in the Sciences, Ghent 2011; and the Causality in the Sciences Reading Group, London 2011 for comments and discussion leading to substantial improvement to the paper. Foundational work for this paper was laid down during my postdoctoral project ‘Mechanisms and Causality’ at the University of Kent, funded by the Leverhulme Trust, although it was completed far beyond the end of the project. I am still grateful for that funding, and for the opportunity to work with Jon Williamson. Finally, I owe great thanks to two reviewers for efforts above and beyond the call of duty to help me improve the paper, but sadly they are anonymous. Remaining errors are, of course, my own.
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Illari, P. Mechanistic Explanation: Integrating the Ontic and Epistemic. Erkenn 78 (Suppl 2), 237–255 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9511-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9511-y