Abstract
We consider a game where players face environmental constraints. We derive and compare noncooperative, cooperative and umbrella scenarios. In the latter, the players couple their environmental constraints and implement Rosen’s normalized equilibrium. It is shown that the cooperative outcome can be generated as a normalized equilibrium and that the results obtained in the literature do not necessarily generalize to this constrained setting.
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Tidball, M., Zaccour, G. An environmental game with coupling constraints. Environ Model Assess 10, 153–158 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-005-5254-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-005-5254-8