Abstract
This article analyzes how the allocation of liability for safety defects could influence coordination in the food supply chain. To do so, we analyzed the strategic reaction of importers and supermarkets who import Spanish fresh produce into France. We considered the implementation and enforcement of the European General Food Law as an exogenous shock for French food operators. In France, depending on the situation, food operators can transfer their liability to someone else in the food supply and imports decisions are crucial indicators. After 2005, supermarkets transferred the liability risk linked to importing sensitive products to importers. We argue that this regulatory change also prompted French importers of fresh produce to develop a horizontal, collective governance structure to monitor the safety of imported produce.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
These data come from the UC Davis post-harvest department: http://postharvest.ucdavis.edu.
According to the French National Statistics Institute (INSEE).
According to the CEPII database.
In the following, we replace the term Pesticides and Perishability by Risky as explained above.
References
Antle, J. (1996). Efficient food safety regulations in the food manufacturing sector. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78, 1242–1247.
Baniak, A., Grajzl, P. (2013). Products liability when firms share a collective reputation. work in progress.
Buzby, J. C., & Frenzen, P. D. (1999). Food safety and product liability. Food Policy, 24(6), 637–651.
Buzby, J.C., Frenzen, P.D., Rasco, B. (2001). Product liability and microbial foodborne illness. USDA, ERS, AER-799. [On-line]. Available: http://webarchives.cdlib.org/sw1tx36512/http:/www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/AER799).
Caswell, J.A., Mojduszka, E. (1996). Using informational labeling to influence the market for quality in food products. NE-165 Working Paper No. 43. Storrs, CT: Northeast Regional Project 165: 17p.
Friant-Perrot, M., Latouche K., Persillet, V. (2007). Le développement hétérogène des référentiels privés en Europe : Etat des lieux et conséquences sur les échanges, Présenté au colloque SFER, Paris, 13–14 décembre, 21p.
Fulponi, L. (2006). Private voluntary standards in the food system: The perspective of major food retailers in OECD countries. Food Policy, 30, 115–128.
Garcia-Martinez, M., & Poole, N. (2004). The development of private fresh produce safety standards: Implications for developing Mediterranean Exporting Countries. Food Policy, 29(3), 229–255.
Garcia-Martinez, M., Fearne, A., Caswell, J. A., & Henson, S. (2007). Co-regulation as a possible model for food safety governance: Opportunities for public–private partnerships. Food Policy, 32(3), 299–314.
Garcia-Martinez, M., Verbrugger, P., & Fearne, A. (2013). Risk-based approaches to food safety regulation: What role for co-regulation? Journal of Risk Research. doi:10.1080/13669877.2012.743157.
Hennessy, D. A., Roosen, J., & Miranowski, J. A. (2001). Leadership and the provision of safe food. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83, 862–874.
Hennessy, D. A., Roosen, J., & Jensen, H. H. (2003). Systemic failure in the provision of safe food. Food Policy, 28, 77–96.
Henson, S., & Caswell, J. A. (1999). Food safety regulation: an overview of contemporary issues. Food Policy, 24(6), 589–603.
Henson, S., & Holt, G. (2001). Exploring incentives for the adoption of food safety controls: Haccp implementation in the U.K. Dairy Sector. Review of Agricultural Economics, 22(2), 407–420.
Henson, S., Northern, J. (1998). Economic determinants of food safety controls in supply of retailer own-branded products in United Kingdom. Agribusiness(14), 113–26.
Hobbs, J. E., & Kerr, W. A. (1992). Costs of monitoring food safety and vertical coordination in agribusiness: What can be learned from the British Food Safety Act 1990? Agribusiness, 8(6), 575–584.
Hobbs, J. E., Fearne, A., & Spriggs, J. (2002). Incentive structures for food safety and quality assurance: an international comparison. Food Control, 13(2), 77–81.
Holleran, E., Bredahl, M. E., & Zaibet, L. (1999). Private incentives for adopting food safety and quality assurance. Food Policy, 24(6), 669–683.
Innes, R. (2004). Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation. International Review of Law and Economics, 24, 29–48.
Koenig., J. (2011). The Federal food safety modernization act: Impacts in import and small-scale production sectors. Harvard University’s DASH repository. [On-line]. Available: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8592051.
Kolstad, C., Ullen, S., & Jhonson, G. (1990). Ex post liability for harm vs. ex ante safety regulation: Substitutes or complements? The American Economic Review, 80(4), 888–901.
Loader, R., & Hobbs, J. (1999). Strategic responses to food safety legislation. Food Policy, 24(6), 685–706.
Loureiro, M. L. (2008). Liability and food safety provision: Empirical evidence from the US. International Review of Law and Economics, 28(3), 204–211.
Macaulay, S. (1993). Business adaptation to regulation: What do we need to known? Law and Policy, 15, 259–269.
Pouliot, S., & Sumner, D. A. (2008). Traceability, liability, and incentives for food safety and quality. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 90(1), 15–27.
Rouvière, E., & Caswell, J. A. (2012). From punishment to prevention: A French case study of the introduction of co-regulation in enforcing food safety. Food Policy, 37(3), 246–254.
Rouvière, E., & Soubeyran, R. (2011). Competition vs. quality in an industry with imperfect traceability. Economics Bulletin, 31(4), 3052–3067.
Rouvière, E., Soubeyran, R., & Bignebat, C. (2010). Heterogeneous efforts in voluntary programmes on food safety: theory and evidence from french imports of fresh produce. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 37(4), 479–499.
Schmitz, P. W. (2000). On the joint use of liability and safety regulation. International Review of Law and Economics, 20(3), 371–382.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding authors
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rouvière, E., Latouche, K. Impact of liability rules on modes of coordination for food safety in supply chains. Eur J Law Econ 37, 111–130 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-013-9413-0
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-013-9413-0