Abstract
The aim of this paper is to study the effects of normative complexity on delays in justice. In particular, a unique database was used, created by reading eight hundred sentences pronounced by the Italian Regional Administrative Courts of first instance (Tribunali Amministrativi Regionali), located in each of the 20 regions in Italy, between 2000 and 2007. After a preliminary analysis of the data, regarding the duration of disputes, their objects and other relevant variables, an econometric study was performed to verify whether the length of administrative disputes may be explained, together with other causes, by the complexity of the legal system. The indicator used as a proxy of normative complexity was developed in previous studies in this field. Different kinds of models were used and specifications performed to render the empirical results more robust. The outcome of the analysis appears to support the idea that normative complexity may be a burden on the activity of courts, and that this could contribute to explaining the slowness of justice proceedings.
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Notes
To understand why, with regard to Italy, we affirm that disputes are excessively slow, it is sufficient to make an international comparison of the average duration of contentious around the world, using the information we may draw from Doing Business report, published yearly by the World Bank (2010); this shows that Italy occupies the one hundred fifty-sixth position in the international ratings of the time necessary to enforce a contract, with an average duration of the lawsuit of 1210 days, and a cost of 29.9% of the claim.
Palumbo and Sette (2006) affirm that the quality of a decision depends on how many technical and legal issues the judge has to go through to make it: a high quality decision resulting from a complex dispute is more indicative of ability than a high quality decision on a dispute that is relatively simple to solve. Harnay and Marciano (2004) emphasise the role of the decision (sentence) of the judge in terms of reputation, signalling his ability in applying the law and avoiding a reformulation of the pronouncement by the High Court judges (Levy 2005; Miceli 1994; Posner 2005).
Miceli and Metin (1994) affirm: “… A reasonable objective of a judge therefore might be to choose actions that will increase his reputation …”.
This system of distribution of jurisdiction between the courts and the TAR based on the individual juridical situation deduced in the trial is subject to some exceptions, if the law entirely devolves some topic to one kind of court. The sentences pronounced by the TAR may be contested in front of the Consiglio di Stato, that is the court of appeal for administrative disputes.
For purposes of replication of our empirical results the full list of the eight hundred sentences used for this study is available upon request from the author.
Technicality is related to the specific language used, that is often an obstacle to understanding for common people (this is typical of civil law countries, Djankov et al. 2002). Finally, the characteristic of indeterminacy is represented by vague or unclear rules, that are expensive to enforce and whose results are not always predictable ex ante, so that they may become a source of uncertainty (Schuck 1992).
The ISTAT classifies the Italian regions in the North: Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Liguria, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Centre: Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio. South: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna.
To verify the robustness of our choice about the best indicator of normative complexity, we have already performed some regressions using as dependent variables the average duration of trials and the time needed to decide disputes, using as regressors the nrl and scc instead of ail. In both hypotheses the R-squared is lower than in cases where the ail indicator is used. The results of those regressions are available upon request from the author and are not fully reported here due to space constraint.
For the use of OLS in regressions performed in aggregate analysis where the dependent variable is the average duration of disputes, see Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis (2007, p. 229).
It is worth noting that even for civil disputes the average duration of controversies, after 6 years of decline, has increased since 2005. This consideration is important because we find the same result using data directly observed and supplied by the ISTAT (now we refer to the average duration of civil law suits).
The results of those regressions enclosing both dummies mentioned in the body of paper are available upon request.
To shed more light on the relevance of indicators of normative complexity on the length of administrative disputes we have performed, using the econometric model reported in Eq. 1, a different empirical analysis approaching the problem using life data analysis. The results employing Cox’s proportional hazard model showed that the duration of disputes and the time needed to decide the disputes are positive correlated with the ail, and are statistically significant at 1% level. Despite this, we consider that survival analysis is not the best approach to apply here, because we address the problem of the relevance of normative complexity with a macroeconomic approach, and the time variable is the average of randomly chosen observations. The duration models are more suitable using all the samples and performing the analysis in a microeconomic way.
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful for invaluable suggestions from an anonymous referee regarding a previous draft of this paper. A preliminary version of this research was presented at the Fifth annual conference of Italian Society of Law and Economics. Florence (Italy), December 4–5, 2009, in an internal seminar given in the Faculty of Economics, Catania (Italy), January 13–14, 2010, and at the Annual Workshop of the European Master Programme in Law and Economics at the University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy, February 12, 2010. This work has been accepted for presentation during the Fifth Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Yale University, November 5–6, 2010, Twenty-seventh conference of European law and Economics Association, Paris (France), September 23–25, 2010, and during the Fifty-first conference of the Italian Society of Economists, Catania (Italy), October 15–16, 2010. All errors are the Author’s alone.
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Vita, G.D. Normative complexity and the length of administrative disputes: evidence from Italian regions. Eur J Law Econ 34, 197–213 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9182-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9182-y
Keywords
- Regional administrative courts
- Fixed effects
- Indicator of legislative complexity
- Panel data
- Rationing of justice services