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Intra-country regulation of share markets: does one size fit all?

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Abstract

A large body of evidence suggests that financial development is greater in countries that impose stricter regulatory requirements on their major stock exchanges, but this leaves open the question of whether or not such regulation should be uniformly applied to all equity trading platforms within a country. On the one hand, regulatory variation permits a wider choice of investment opportunities for investors, lowers the cost of capital for some firms, and enhances price discovery and efficiency. On the other hand, the presence of lightly regulated exchanges can potentially have adverse spillover implications for a country’s other financial markets.

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Notes

  1. Such arrangements offered little explicit investor protection, largely because participation required considerable effort on the part of investors, who were thus assumed to be sophisticated and knowledgeable.

  2. For details on the differences between these markets, see Bushee and Leuz (2005).

  3. The regulatory requirements imposed on OFEX issuers are, nevertheless, arguably weaker than those applied to AIM issuers.

  4. For a review of the pros and cons of mandatory disclosure requirements, see Bushee and Leuz (2005); for a discussion of the merits of insider trading restrictions, see Bainbridge (2000) and Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). A large number of papers have assessed the effects of the corporate governance provisions in the United States Sarbannes-Oxley Act—see, for example, Romano (2005).

  5. See, for example, Stigler (1964).

  6. See Black (2001) for legal discussion, or Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) for economic analysis.

  7. Giving firms the ability to opt for listing on an organised trading platform without having to incur the costs of full regulatory compliance also encourages competitive efficiencies, since it provides traditional exchanges with an incentive to minimise the costs of listing and rule compliance—see Rust and Hall (2003).

  8. Greenstone et al. (2006) note that 1964 legislation imposing tougher disclosure requirements on United States over-the-counter securities was associated with abnormal excess returns on those securities, suggesting that investors valued the stronger requirements, at least initially.

  9. This may not be true if the presence of a lightly-regulated trading platform attracts migration of firms from the more heavily-regulated platform, We address this point in more detail later in this section.

  10. Additional steps are sometimes taken to segregate investors and investments. For example, should naïve investors inadvertently attempt to access Unlisted’s website, they must first declare that they have read and understood a prominent disclaimer regarding the company’s regulatory status before they can proceed any further.

  11. Foreign investors might suffer disproportionately from information problems because local investors are, or can more easily be, better informed about local firms’ governance, management and prospects. See Leuz et al. (2005).

  12. See Parisi et al. (2004) for a detailed discussion of the relevance of this principle to legislation in general.

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Acknowledgements

For helpful comments and suggestions, we are grateful to Bevan Wallace, Graeme Guthrie, seminar participants at ISCR, LEANZ and the 2006 AFAANZ annual conference, and an anonymous EJLE referee. However, any remaining errors and ambiguities are solely our responsibility. For funding assistance, we are indebted to Efficient Market Services Ltd, but the views expressed in this paper are ours alone.

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Correspondence to Glenn Boyle.

Appendix: Determining the appropriate test for the imposition of uniform regulation

Appendix: Determining the appropriate test for the imposition of uniform regulation

The value B of the future expected benefits stream is uncertain and evolves according to the geometric Brownian motion process

$$ dB = \mu B\,dt + \sigma B\,d\xi $$
(A1)

where μ and σ are constant parameters and is a Wiener process. To keep things as simple as possible without losing anything essential, we assume the value C of the future expected costs stream is fixed.

The regulator has a perpetual option on the payoff (BC). Let the value of this option be denoted by F(B; B*), where B* is the optimal stopping value, i.e., the value of B at which uniform regulation is justified. The Bellman optimality principle implies

$$ E[dF] = \rho Fdt $$
(A2)

where ρ is a discount rate. Applying Ito’s Lemma to F and using (A1), Eq. A2 can be written as

$$ \frac{1} {2}\sigma ^{2} B^{2} {F}^{\prime \prime} + (\rho - \delta )V{F}^{\prime} - \rho F = 0 $$

where δ = (μ − ρ). Solving this differential equation yields

$$ F(B;{\text{ }}B^{*}) = (B^{*} - C){\text{ }}{\left( {\frac{B} {{B^{*}}}} \right)}^{\gamma } $$

where

$$ \gamma = {\left( {\frac{1} {2} - \frac{{r - \delta }} {{\sigma ^{2} }}} \right)} + {\sqrt {\frac{{2r}} {{\sigma ^{2} }} + {\left( {\frac{1} {2} - \frac{{r - \delta }} {{\sigma ^{2} }}} \right)}^{2} } } > 1 $$

Maximising F in the usual way then provides the solution for B*:

$$ B^{*} = \lambda C $$

where \( \lambda \equiv {\left( {\gamma \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {\gamma {\gamma - 1}}} \right. \kern-\nulldelimiterspace} {\gamma - 1}} \right)}{\text{ $ > $ 1}} \)

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Boyle, G., Meade, R. Intra-country regulation of share markets: does one size fit all?. Eur J Law Econ 25, 151–165 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-008-9043-0

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