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A Naval Revolution and Institutional Change: The Case of the United Provinces

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Abstract

This study starting from the debate of the influence of the so-called military revolution on the emergence of modern states, analyses the neglected aspect of the influence of seapower on socioeconomic change, using a formal model. It is maintained that the choice of seapower by a state leads to a different regime than the choice of land military power, because sustainable seapower necessitates a wide alliance of interests, which brings with it more democratic regimes, develops new more efficient and complex forms of organizations, requires the acquisition and diffusion of new knowledge and expertise that brings with it institutional change and economic growth. The present study concludes with a short presentation of the United Provinces (the Dutch Republic) turn to the sea.

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Correspondence to George E. Halkos.

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JEL Classification: N0, N4, C7, O0

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Halkos, G.E., Kyriazis, N.C. A Naval Revolution and Institutional Change: The Case of the United Provinces. Eur J Law Econ 19, 41–68 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-005-5275-4

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