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Credible Criminal Enforcement

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Abstract

Economic models of crime and punishment implicitly assume that the government can credibly commit to the fines, sentences, and apprehension rates it has chosen. We study the government’s problem when credibility is an issue. We find that several of the standard predictions of the economic model are altered when commitment is taken into account. Specifically, when only fines are used, commitment results in a lower apprehension rate and hence a higher crime rate. However, when jail is used (with or without fines), apprehension rates and jail terms may be higher or lower compared to the optimal static policy.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD

    Matthew J. Baker

  2. Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, 06269-1063

    Thomas J. Miceli

Authors
  1. Matthew J. Baker
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  2. Thomas J. Miceli
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Correspondence to Matthew J. Baker.

Additional information

JEL K14, K42

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Baker, M.J., Miceli, T.J. Credible Criminal Enforcement. Eur J Law Econ 20, 5–15 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-005-1011-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-005-1011-3

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