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The Timing and Strategic Role of Self-Protection

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Abstract

Self-protection has private goods characteristics as it reduces own exposure to pollution given a certain level of pollution. We study the effect of timing self-protection before, after or simultaneously with abatement. We find that self-protection when timed before abatements has strategic effects. In this case self-protection, shifts the second stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of abatements such that own contributions of abatement are decreased and those of the other country are increased. Thereby shifting future abatement costs to the other country. When countries cooperate only on abatement, the incentives to shift future abatement costs are greater. Contrary to, intention, cooperation on abatement may in fact worsen environmental quality if it does not include self-protection.

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  1. Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, P.O. Box 7013, 75007, Uppsala, Sweden

    Ficre Zehaie

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  1. Ficre Zehaie
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Correspondence to Ficre Zehaie.

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Zehaie, F. The Timing and Strategic Role of Self-Protection. Environ Resource Econ 44, 337–350 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-009-9289-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-009-9289-1

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